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Abstract 
The following dissertation contains two related essays. The first essay explores how institutional 
investor presence impacts investments during the global financial crisis. Using OLS, industry 
fixed effects, and Heckman 2SLS regression approaches, I explore two ways through which 
institutional investors could impact investments: liquidity and monitoring. My findings best 
support monitoring theory. I find that institutional investors monitor capital and R&D levels to 
maximize crisis period firm value. 
The second essay is a direct fallout from my first essay. In it, I investigate how institutional 
investor types influence investments.  I ask, do certain types of investors improve liquidity or 
monitor firm investment behavior during the global financial crisis?  My results suggest that 
long-term, dedicated institutional investors monitor firm investments more than short-term, 
transient investors. As a result, firms with greater dedicated investor presence perform better 
during the crisis periods than their peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Institutional investors, monitoring theory, Heckman 2SLS, Industry Fixed Effects, 
Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, Corporate Finance 
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Chapter 1 
“Do institutional investors affect firm investments? Evidence from the Global Financial 
Crisis.” 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I address how institutional investors affect performance during the Global 
Financial Crisis by looking at institutional investors’ influence on investments.  I explore two 
ways institutional investors may influence investments: through easing of financing constraints 
and through monitoring.  Understanding how ownership structure of equity affects decisions and 
ultimately performance of the firm is important to managers and board members who, in the 
interest of their shareholders, are trying to make decisions which maximize firm value.  Investors 
themselves are also interested in this relationship as they want to allocate their funds to firms 
which will offer the highest return on risk for their capital.  Understanding different 
characteristics which ultimately affect performance leads to an increased informational 
environment from which investors can make better decisions.   
The effects of equity distribution on firm behavior has been studied extensively in past 
literature. One vast strand of literature focuses on the corporate governance provided by 
institutional investors, such as insurance firms, investment companies, pension funds, banks, and 
money managers.  Recently, the literature has focused on the role of institutional investors as 
providers and facilitators of capital access.  The monitoring services provided by large 
institutional investors lowers information asymmetries (Boone and White, 2015) and creates 
better access to cheaper external financing (Alvarez et al., 2016).  Furthermore, because 
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institutional investors lower financial constraints for the firms in which they invest, these 
reduced financial constraints lessen the investment-cash flow sensitivity (Agca and Mozumdar, 
2008).  In addition, institutional investors can directly provide capital which allows firms to 
maximize the efficiency of their firm-investments (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Chemmanur et 
al., 2009; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Denis and Milhov, 2002).  This support becomes 
particularly important during periods of financial crisis when credit is squeezed and cash flows 
begin to dry up.  Institutional investors, who have better information and resources and are better 
able to perceive the value of projects can facilitate the capital necessary to fund them. 
Motivated by this line of study, I research the impact of institutional investors on firm 
liquidity by studying whether institutional investor presence and ownership concentration affect 
firm investments during the 2007-2009 financial crisis.   If capital access is valuable to firms, it 
is likely to be especially valuable during periods of credit rationing in the financial market. As 
enablers of capital access, the role of institutional investors will then be more valuable to the 
firm during these periods of heightened credit contractions.  One conduit through which this 
improved capital access can manifest is firm investments.  During a liquidity crunch, it is tougher 
to raise external financing to fund investments, and as a result, firms must decrease their 
investments.  However, I posit that firms which have institutional investor presence, and thus 
easier access to credit, are better able to attract financing when it is sparse and therefore do not 
have to decrease their investments to the same extent as their peers.   
However, using investments to study institutional investors’ impact on firm liquidity can 
be complicated by the fact that it is also possible that institutional investors’ active monitoring 
efforts outweigh any liquidity impact they provide.  Monitoring theory suggests that institutional 
investors, which often invest large amounts in a company, are incentivized to monitor manager 
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decisions to decrease agency costs and ensure firm behavior maximizes shareholder value.  They 
are able to benefit from their monitoring efforts because their size and expertise allows them to 
monitor manager decisions at a lower cost than small, atomistic shareholders (Pound, 1988). 
While we are searching if institutional investors allow firms to maintain investments during a 
liquidity crunch, it is possible we find that institutional investors encourage firms to change their 
investment behavior instead. Because of this, in addition to exploring institutional investors’ 
effect on liquidity through investments, I also investigate if institutional investors use 
investments as a tool to monitor firm behavior.  While much literature relates how ownership 
structure impacts investments (see Jarrell and Lehn, 1985; Basinger, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; 
Fahlenbrach, 2009),  Hill and Snell (1988) find that high ownership concentration positively 
influences investment in R&D resulting in greater firm profitability. Bushee (1998) finds that 
institutional ownership alleviates management pressures for short-term focused R&D investing, 
however, certain types of investors may induce managers to change investment behavior to 
reverse an earnings decline.  Beyond these studies, very few articles explore if investments are a 
conduit through which institutional investors monitor firm decisions to influence firm 
performance and none analyze the monitoring hypothesis effects of institutional investors during 
periods of financial crisis.  It is important to study how institutional owners monitor and affect 
firm value during economic declines because this dynamic relationship may alter direction or 
magnitude as the economic environment changes. If institutional investors provide monitoring 
services to the firms in which they invest which increases firm performance, then I expect their 
presence to become more valuable during periods of broad economic decline.   
 In my empirical analysis, I research how institutional investors impact investments in 
both capital and R&D.  Using regression analysis to conduct my studies is made more difficult 
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by the presence of endogeneities and self- selection bias.  Firms in different industries have very 
different needs for capital and R&D as well as different average levels of performance.  Because 
of the industry specific nature of investments, I use Industry Fixed Effects to correct for this bias.  
In addition, institutional investors may choose to invest in high value firms or firms with specific 
investment behaviors.  To correct for this selection bias, I use Heckman Two Stage Least 
Squares.  Using these methods, I do not find evidence through the investments mechanism that 
institutional investors provide improved capital access.  However, my results indicate that 
institutional investors actively monitor investment behavior during the crisis period which helps 
mitigate losses.  This finding is consistent with monitoring theory whereby institutional investors 
encourage managers to invest at a level which maximizes firm value.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a thorough review of 
how institutional investors impact firms through monitoring and access to credit.  Section 3 
describes the methodology and dataset.  Section 4 focuses on our regression analysis results.  
Section 5 provides concluding comments. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a plethora of literature which discusses how institutional investors affect firm decisions.  
I am interested in how institutional investors influence investment decisions through their impact 
on financial constraints.  Hall (2002) discusses three types of problems that make raising external 
funds to finance investments more difficult: adverse selection, moral hazard, and tax 
considerations.  Adverse selection arises when the firm has more information about its 
investments than its financers. Because of the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s investments, 
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investors are less willing to provide external financing. Moral Hazard occurs when there is 
separation of ownership and management.  Managers may choose to invest more heavily in 
projects that benefit them, for example growing the firm beyond efficient scale. Or managers 
may be more risk-averse than shareholders and may underinvest in riskier types of projects.  
Boone and White (2015) explain that firms with greater institutional investor presence have 
greater analyst following, and the monitoring provided by institutional investors allow those 
firms to experience lower information asymmetries as well as improved liquidity.  Alvarez et al. 
(2016) document a similar result while investigating emerging markets.  They find that 
institutional investors, which actively monitor firm decisions, reduce financial constraints 
because investor activism, lower monitoring costs, and better corporate governance improves the 
information environment.   
Tax considerations also impact the financing of investments.  Hall (2002) explains, 
because of the personal tax rate, capital gains tax rate, and dividends tax rate, financing 
investments with retained earnings and newly issued equity can be more expensive than 
financing investments with debt.  The presence of institutional investors can also directly help 
mitigate financial constraints. First, institutional investors can help firms acquire debt.  
Institutional investors can directly lend to firms, for example to small firms which have trouble 
raising public debt (Krishnaswami et al., 1999) or low-credit firms which have trouble accessing 
bank loans (Denis and Milhov, 2002).  Institutional investors are also part of a broader network 
of firms which support liquidity.  For example, hedge funds, banks, and insurance companies, all 
or which are types of institutional investors, are very connected to each other (Billio et al., 2012). 
As a result of this connectedness, institutional investors can facilitate capital access through other 
intermediaries. For example, Berger and Udell (1998) explain that about 80% of venture capitals 
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are made up of limited partnerships where 98% of the funds are supplied by institutional 
investors.  Thus, institutional investors are an important source of funds that are lent to firms by 
venture capital firms; they are part of a broader network that is facilitating capital access. In 
support of these studies, Ismail and Krishnaswami (2017 working paper) study lines of credit and 
find that institutional investors alleviate financial constraints in the credit market.  Secondly, 
institutional investors can help firms directly raise equity.  In the event new shares are issued, 
institutional investors can directly provide the firm with capital for investments by purchasing 
the new equity. For example, Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) show that institutional investors are 
the primary purchasers of new IPO’s, while Chemmanur et al. (2009) shows that institutional 
investors possess private information about SEO’s and obtain more allocations of SEO’s in 
which they collect favorable information. Thus, institutional investors providing direct purchases 
of new equity becomes particularly important during the financial crisis when credit is squeezed 
and cash flows begin to dry up.  In summary, institutional investors, who have better information 
and resources and are better able to perceive the value of projects can facilitate the capital 
necessary to fund them.  
Because firms with greater institutional investor presence have lower financial 
constraints, they find their cash-flow sensitivity to investments is also significantly reduced. This 
finding is consistent with Agca and Mozumdar (2008) who look at U.S. Manufacturing firms and 
find that institutional ownership decreases the cost wedge between internal and external 
financing leading to lower investment-cash flow sensitivities.  Most related to my study, Schain 
and Stieble (2016) relate institutional investors’ impact on financial constraints to investments 
and find that in industries which rely more heavily on external financing, institutional investors 
decrease financial constraints, and this induces innovation.    
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Another vast avenue of research that explores how institutional investors influence firm 
decisions is the monitoring hypothesis which describes that institutional investors provide value 
added monitoring services to the firms in which they invest.  Pound (1988) explains that 
institutional investors and corporate value are positively related because institutional investors 
are large enough to benefit from their monitoring activity, have greater expertise and are able to 
monitor management at lower costs than can small, individual shareholders.  Other early studies 
prove that large investors have the incentive and ability to monitor firms to ensure managers are 
acting in the best interest of shareholders through a number of ways, including, but not limited 
to, informal conversations and proxy votes (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 
1997).  Black (1992) shows that institutional shareholders lower monitoring costs by using their 
informational advantages to better collect and analyze firm decisions.  In addition to monitoring 
firm decisions, large institutional investors have substantial voting power allowing them to 
assume an active role and directly influence manager decisions.  Past literature demonstrates how 
active institutional investors use their power to influence management to modify their 
governance structures and operating decisions to be more in line with shareholders’ goals (Smith, 
1996; Strickland, Wiles, and Zennery, 1996; Wahal, 1996).  Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) 
presents evidence that institutional investors vote more actively on antitakeover amendments 
than do other shareholders.  Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find a significantly positive relation 
between institutional ownership and stockholder wealth effects of different types of antitakeover 
charter amendments, and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and Tobin’s q; both studies support the monitoring hypothesis.  Hartzell 
and Starks (2000) discuss that institutional investors can directly influence firms by instigating a 
change, or they can indirectly influence firms by choosing to sell their shares rather than trying 
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to promote a change in the firm, sometimes referred to as the exit strategy.  An institutional 
investor selling their shares could cause “downward price pressure due to supply-demand effects, 
information signals to other investors, and changes in shareholder composition.”  This alone is 
enough to incentivize firms to act in the interest of their institutional investors.  Hartzell and 
Starks conclude there is a significantly negative relationship between level of executive 
compensation and concentration of institutional ownership suggesting institutional investors do 
in fact play a significant monitoring role in firms thereby reducing the shareholder-manager 
agency problem. Demiralp et al. (2011) explain that the positive relationship found between 
post-SEO announcement returns and institutional ownership suggest that institutional ownership 
“serve[s] a monitoring role and improve[s] firm’s performance.” Similarly, Aggrawal et al. 
(2011) determine that institutional investors promote corporate governance internationally.  In 
summary, there is overwhelming evidence explaining that monitoring efforts of institutional 
investors positively influences firm value during normal economic environments.   
One way institutional investors can monitor firms to maximize firm value is by ensuring 
managers are making investment decisions in line with long-term shareholder goals. However, 
early literature suggests that the market, and thus its characteristics (like ownership structure), 
has no substantial effects on firm investment decisions (Modigliani and Miller, 1958.) 
Supporting this idea, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) find that the stock market only 
marginally affects capital expenditure, and the relationship is not a result of the stock market 
providing information to managers or the costs of external financing.  Instead, the relationship 
between market prices and investment could be partly explained by investors pressuring 
managers to make investment decisions in line with shareholder values, but it is not the dominant 
force driving the results.  Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993) find that managers do not 
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consider market valuation of firm when making investment decisions. All of these studies 
suggest that the market does not significantly impact investment decisions, and this conclusion 
contradicts other literature of the time and is no longer relevant.  
The economic environment has changed over the years. Better information and financial 
innovation has made access to equity significantly easier, and thus it has become more important 
in our economy, and its influence on investment decisions has increased.  The evolution of the 
literature depicts this progression in the markets. Recent literature consistently shows that market 
characteristics have significant impacts on investment behavior.   Jarrell and Lehn (1985) use 
OLS to find a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and R&D 
expenditures. Hill and Snell (1988) find a positive relationship between R&D expenditures and 
concentration of equity ownership in research-intensive industries suggesting large shareholders 
influence investment in R&D, and this results in greater firm profitability.  Gugler et al. (2000) 
conclude that firms’ investment sensitivity to cash flow decreases as market value rises and its 
ability to finance with external capital improves. Baker et al. (2003) ranks firms per “equity 
dependence,” and find that firms with different levels of equity dependence have different 
investment-q sensitivities suggesting that the stock market does affect investment behavior.   
Following this path of literature, I am interested in how characteristics of equity, namely the 
ownership structure, affect investment decisions in periods of economic crisis.    
In order to understand how institutional investors impact investments during periods of 
economic decline, it is important to first understand how investments behave during these 
periods.  There are two primary observations on the relationship between long term investments 
and the business cycle: First, investments are pro-cyclical. That is, during periods of economic 
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distress, firms decrease their investments. Second, investments are counter-cyclical; during 
periods of economic distress, firms increase their investments. 
The theoretical explanations that dominate the current literature on the pro-cyclicality of 
R&D fall into two categories: Demand-pull Argument or Financial constraints argument. The 
demand-pull argument details how investments are more likely to decrease during periods of 
growth.  Firms only have a window of opportunity to capitalize on their innovations before 
competition increases. Consequently, firms want to implement their innovations when the 
economy is strong and they can realize the highest benefit.  Geroski and Walters (1995) explore 
the direction of the relationship between innovation and demand. They find that demand Granger 
causes innovation, and that innovative activity fluctuates pro-cyclically.  Barlevy (2007) explains 
the short-sightedness of entrepreneurs results in increased innovation during booms rather than 
recessions.  He explains that firms decide to invest in R&D based on the benefits it will receive 
from such innovation. During recessions, the profits of R&D are overly-discounted and do not 
reflect the future advantages of today’s investments when the economy improves; as a result, 
firms under invest in R&D during recessions.  Fatas (2000) explores how business cycles alter 
the growth process.  He explains that recessionary periods are characterized by low demand and 
thus low incentives to innovate. Because innovation decreases during recessions, the post-
recessionary period is plagued by stagnant productivity.   Dangl and Wu (2013) analyze 
aggregate capital growth rate from physical investments over the business cycle.  The authors 
observe then create a model to reflect the strong evidence of asymmetry where aggregate 
corporate investments fall much faster than they recover. Furthermore, the growth rate of capital 
is “more sensitive to bad signals in good times than to good signals in bad times.” 
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One byproduct of shrinking demand that characterizes periods of recession is that it leads 
to decreases in cash flows. As the internal financing dries up from decreased cash flows, so too 
do investments. During recessions, firms typically become more financially constrained.  Thus, 
one would expect to see R&D expenditures fall (Fazzari et al., 1988; Allayannis and Mozumdar, 
2004; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach, 2004; Cleary, Povel and Raith, 2007.)   Hall (1992) 
adds to the literature when they conclude that firms do not finance R&D with debt, and profit is 
positively related to R&D likely due to the cash flows effect and not the demand effect.  
Himmelberg and Peterson (1994) use a different methodology that leads them to the same results 
confirming a positive relationship between internal financing and both R&D and physical 
investments. 
However, literature also suggests we could observe an increase in R&D investments 
during the financial crisis.  The theoretical explanation that dominates the current literature on 
the counter-cyclicality of R&D is the opportunity cost argument.  The basis of the theory 
explaining why firms increase their R&D during recessions derives from Schumpeter’s cyclical 
theory of economic development which describes recessions as periods of correction where old 
processes are replaced with new to keep the economy on an equilibrium trajectory.  In these 
recessionary periods, profitability falls, and as a result, the opportunity cost of investments fall 
spurring an increase in investment activity. Because of decreasing opportunity costs of R&D 
investment—the sales or profits that could have been realized if funds were appropriated in the 
direction of production instead of investment—firms will increase their R&D. Hall (1991) 
explains that during recessions, firms must decide between producing goods or reorganizing. He 
states that “optimal capital utilization declines in recessions” making it relatively cheaper to 
transfer capital from producing to research and development. Caballero and Hammour (1991) 
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describe recessions as periods of “cleansing” where old methods are scrapped and new methods 
are instilled to promote productivity—a process the authors refer to as creative destruction. 
However, one issue remains. Even if the opportunity cost of investing is falling making the 
optimal level of investment expenditure increase, the firm must have the financing to increase its 
investments.  Lopez-Garcia (2012) test the opportunity cost theory on French firms and find that 
in the absence of credit constraints, R&D investments are countercyclical.  However, when credit 
constraints are present, they hinder R&D investment.  Arvantis and Woerter (2013) categorize 
manufacturing firms in Switzerland based on their R&D investment behavior during economic 
fluctuations and explore which characteristics are present in different these different types of 
firms.  They find that 42% of firms invest pro-cyclically and 17% invest counter-cyclically with 
the rest showing no systematic behavior.  Furthermore, the authors find that firms with larger 
sales shares of R&D investments that are less frequently cooperating with universities, and are 
not exposed to intensive price competition tend to demonstrate counter-cyclical R&D investment 
behavior.  Beneito et al. (2015) confirm that investments in R&D in Spanish manufacturing firms 
are also countercyclical for firms which are not financially constrained, but credit constrained 
firms’ investment in R&D is less counter-cyclical and sometimes pro-cyclical. The authors’ most 
interesting implication is that owner types affect the relationship between R&D and the business 
cycle. They find that family-owned firms and group-affiliated owned firms are considerably less 
dependent on being credit constrained and invest in R&D in a counter-cyclical fashion; firms 
with public capital participation do not display strong evidence of counter-cyclicality.   
Knudsen and Lien (2013) reconcile the theories of pro-cyclicality and counter-cyclicality 
of investments when they explain that all recessions are marked by reductions in demand and 
reductions in access to credit.  The authors explain that recessionary characteristics affect 
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investments differently. As demand decreases, the firm produces less and the opportunity costs 
of using idle labor resources in R&D decreases resulting in an increase in R&D.  As internal 
financing dries up and access to credit decreases, financing their projects becomes more 
expensive and tougher, resulting in a decrease in R&D.  Thus, the ultimate change in a firm’s 
R&D during a recession depends on whether the opportunity cost effect or cash flow effect is 
greater.  Knudsen and Lien find that financial constraints “have a stronger negative effect on 
R&D investments than the positive effect of reduced opportunity costs…similarly R&D 
investments are less sensitive to changes in demand than physical investments, due to the higher 
adjustment cost and the opportunity cost effect.”   
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATASET 
3.1 Estimation Procedure 
Using regression analysis to explore how the presence of institutional investors affects 
investments during the Global Financial Crisis has its share of difficulties.  I begin by employing 
OLS regression.  However, there are two main reasons why this model can lead to biased 
coefficients.  I correct for these biases in the following ways. 
First, firms in different industries have very different needs for investment.  One obvious 
example, manufacturing firms have a greater need for capital investments whereas tech firms 
tend to be more R&D intensive.  Furthermore, the value placed on these different types of firms 
also varies dramatically amongst industries. As a result, it is important to control for any industry 
effects.  To do this, I run my models using Industry Fixed Effects.  When doing so, I use the F-
test of joint significance of the fixed effects intercepts to test the null hypothesis that all the fixed 
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effects intercepts are zero.  If the null is rejected, the fixed effects method is more appropriate.  
For my regressions, the p-values associated to the F-statistic and the Chi-square statistic are 
0.0000, which provides strong evidence against the null hypothesis that the fixed effects are all 
equal to each other. This suggests that there is unobserved heterogeneity and fixed effects needs 
to be used. This makes sense intuitively because the variables being considered are time-varying.  
To ensure the fixed effects model is more appropriate than the random effects model, I also use 
the Hausman test.  When performing the Hausman test on my regressions, I receive p-values 
equal to 0 suggesting individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors indicating that 
fixed effects is preferred. 
Secondly, OLS fails to control for self-selection bias that is present in the study of 
institutional investors.  In this paper, I am exploring if institutional investors play a role in firms’ 
investment decisions and subsequent performance during periods of financial crisis.  However, I 
must also consider the process through which institutional investors choose the firms in which 
they invest.  That is, investors may choose to allocate their investments to firms that follow a 
specific high or low investment strategy. For example, firms which invest heavily in R&D are 
deemed riskier because there is high uncertainty surrounding this type of investment.  Because of 
this, more risk averse investors may choose to not invest in these types of firms.  Even if 
investors do not directly choose firms based on investment strategies, they may choose firms 
based on other factors that affect investments, such as a firm’s performance.  To account for this 
self-selection bias, I run my models use Heckman two stage least squares with instrumental 
variables.  In the first stage, I use a probit model to test the likelihood that institutional investors 
choose firms based on investment levels, performance, and other factors.  A probit model is 
needed as it assumes that the error term follows a standard normal distribution.  Following the 
15 
 
first stage, the inverse mills ratio is calculated and then included as an independent variable in 
the second stage.  In the second stage, I test how institutional investors impact investments 
during the financial crisis while using the inverse mills ratio to correct for self-selection.  I also 
separately test how institutional investors impact performance during the financial crisis. 
 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Performance Variables 
Following McConnell and Servaes (1990), I measure firm performance using Tobin’s Q where Q 
equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.  I use Fama and French’s 
definition of book value of equity.  Book value of equity equals the book value of stockholders’ 
equity, plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the redemption value 
of preferred stock. (The Compustat variables to measure book value of equity are BE= 
SEQQ+TXDITCQ-PSTKRQ).  The book value of assets is the compustat variable “Total 
Assets,” and Market value of equity equals the product of “Total shares outstanding” and 
“Closing Price” (or CSHOQ x PRCCQ).  Putting these together, I am able to calculate Q which 
reflects a firm’s value and growth opportunities. 
Q = (ATQ – BE + ME) / ATQ. 
3.2.2 Investment Behavior Variables 
To analyze if institutional investors influence investment behavior, I look at two Compustat 
variables which represent the ways in which managers invest- Capital expenditure and Research 
and development expenditures.  Similar to Cho (1998), I normalize both expenditure types by the 
book value of assets.   
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Capital expenditures and R&D expenditures are ways in which a firm can directly invest 
in itself.  Capital expenditures (CAPXY) represents cash funds used for additions to the 
company's property, plant and equipment. The Compustat quarterly capital expenditure variable 
is accumulated year to date. Thus, I create CAPXYQ which measures expenditures on capital 
investments each quarter. Capital expenditures are used to purchase new assets or update old 
assets which will help make the business more efficient and profitable shortly after installation.  
In addition, if the capital purchased is deemed a failure, that is it does not ultimately benefit the 
firm, the firm could re-sell the physical property and recoup some of its losses.  Because of the 
nature of capital expenditures, they are considered to be less-risky than other forms of long term 
investments.   
Research and development expenditures (XRDY) includes all costs incurred during the 
year that relates to the development of new products or services. Again, the Compustat quarterly 
research and development expenditure variable is year to date; I create XRDYQ which measures 
the expenditures on research and development investments for each quarter.  Unlike capital 
expenditures where the product of the costs is a tangible good, the product of research and 
development expenditures is often knowledge or technology.  In addition, much of the cost of 
R&D is wages to researchers who are exploring and developing these new ideas which are not 
immediately profitable.  It can take months or years for a product to come to fruition from the 
R&D expenditures; improving short term earnings are not the goal with these investments.  In 
addition, there is a high degree of uncertainty with R&D output. Because R&D is non-rival, once 
the knowledge is created, many firms can free-ride from its accumulation.  To benefit from its 
creation, R&D firms are often very secretive about the projects they are working on.  In addition, 
if the research is not successful, or the firm loses a researcher, there is no ability to recover 
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losses.  Because of this, R&D investments are considered to be much riskier.  Because of the 
differing nature of capital expenditures and research and development expenditures, I expect that 
institutional investors treat them differently, and so I explore each investment type 
independently.  
3.2.3 Institutional Investor Variables 
To analyze the impact of institutional investor presence on firm performance and investor 
behavior, I use four proxies for institutional investor presence derived from Demiralp et al, 
(2011).  First, I calculate the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors.   
Percii = 
# 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
The institutional ownership percentages do not include institutions which own less than 
$100million in assets under management.  Furthermore, database errors permit percentages to 
be greater than 100%.  To correct for this, I delete any observation where percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by institutional investors is greater than 1.  
Afterwards, I use a dummy variable to split firms where percentage owned by 
institutional investors is greater than zero into quartiles where the higher the dummy variable, the 
higher the percentage of shares outstanding are owned by institutions.  Firms where dummy 
equals “0” have no institutional investors. Firms where the dummy variable equals “1” have 
institutional ownership where the percentage of shares owned by institutions are in the bottom 
25% of percentage shares owned by institutional investors. Firms denoted by a dummy variable 
“4” have institutional ownership where the percentage of shares owned by institutions is in the 
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top 25%.  Firms where the dummy variable equals “2,” “3,” fill out the middle quartile range. I 
also create quintile variables to see if my results are sensitive to small changes in the variable 
definition, and I find the same results whether I use quartile or quintiles.  As a result, I only 
discuss the quartile institutional investor dummy variable. 
 Last, I calculate two concentration variables.  The first, called “herf”, is a Herfindahl-
style index that equals the sum of squares of the proportions of the firm’s shares held by 
institutional investors, j, for firm, i, during period t. 
Herfi,t = ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠2 =  ∑(
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠
𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
)2 
The second concentration variable is “C5,” and it is the fractional ownership of the five largest 
institutions for each quarter.   
C5 = 
# 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡𝑜𝑝 5 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
 
3.2.4 Crisis Period Variables 
In this dissertation, I study the impact institutional investors have on investment expenditures 
and subsequent firm performance during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis. The Global 
Financial Crisis is a unique event that allows us to explore this relationship.  Kuppaswamy and 
Villalonga (2010) explain that the early quarters of the financial crisis represent “an ideal setting 
for studying the effects of corporate finance on investment” because the crisis is contained in the 
credit market where it originated from the descent of the consumer finance (housing) market.  At 
this point, the deteriorating economy is not a result of corporate finance or business/economic 
fundamentals, thus any change we see in investment behavior is not because of a worsening in 
the availability of quality investments, but because of a reduction in liquidity.   Like 
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Kuppaswamy and Villalonga, I break the recessionary period into two distinct crisis periods: the 
financial crisis and the economic crisis.  I create a dummy variable “fincrisis” which equals 1 if 
the quarter is between Q42007 and Q32008, otherwise “fincrisis” equals 0.  I create a dummy 
variable “econcrisis” which equals 1 if the quarter is between Q42008 and Q22009, otherwise 
“econcrisis” equals 0.  However, my  measure varies only slightly as I coincide the beginning of 
the financial crisis period and the end of the economic crisis period with the National Bureau of 
Economic Research’s definition of the global recession. 
3.2.5 Control Variables 
Borrowing from past literature, I use a number of variables to control for different firm 
characteristics in my various models.  To control for performance, I include leverage and firm 
size. To control for characteristics affecting investments, I include liquidity, volatility of profits, 
and salesgrowth.  Definitions for each of these variables can be found in Appendix A.  
3.2.6 Instrumental Variable 
The Heckman 2SLS model requires an instrumental variable for institutional investor presence in 
my first stage regression.  Following Karpavicius and Yu (2014), I include a S&P500 dummy 
variable to instrument for institutional investor presence.  The authors argue that S&P500 is not 
affected by a firm’s financing policies or its expenditures on investments but it is positively 
correlated with institutional ownership. 
3.2.7 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the Descriptive Statistics for my variables of interest 
from different samples. Panel A displays the descriptive statistics for the full sample which 
includes both firms with institutional investor presence as well as firms with no institutional 
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investor presence.  Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for institutional investor firms only, 
and Panel C presents the descriptive statistics for firms with no institutional investor presence at 
all. All samples include quarterly data spanning from Quarter 1 of 2003 through Quarter 2 of 
2009.  Table 2 shows summary statistics for the top 10 industries where institutional investors 
have the greatest presence.  It is apparent in this table that firm-level statistics in each industry 
vary by institutional investor presence. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for full sample, firms with institutional investor presence, and 
firms with no institutional investor presence. 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 N MIN MAX MEAN STD 
CapEx 116402.0000 -0.1389 0.2901 0.0166 0.0400 
R&D 127735.0000 -0.1891 0.6043 0.0196 0.0652 
Q 107335.0000 0.2342 281.1128 6.8900 23.3837 
PercII 127735.0000 0.0000 0.9919 0.1134 0.2465 
Herf 127735.0000 0.0000 0.1579 0.0057 0.0152 
C5 127735.0000 0.0000 0.6748 0.0591 0.1202 
Panel B: Institutional Investor Firm Sample 
CapEx 41337.0000 -0.1389 0.2901 0.0151 0.0338 
R&D 44026.0000 -0.1891 0.6043 0.0181 0.0570 
Q 40006.0000 0.2342 281.1128 3.4376 10.1505 
PercII 44026.0000 0.000001 0.9919 0.3290 0.3245 
Herf 44026.0000 0.0000 0.1579 0.0166 0.0221 
C5 44026.0000 0.0000 0.6748 0.1714 0.1505 
Panel C: No Institutional Investor Firm Sample 
CapEx 75065.0000 -0.1389 0.2901 0.0174 0.0430 
R&D 83709.0000 -0.1891 0.6043 0.0203 0.0691 
Q 67329.0000 0.2342 281.1128 8.9414 28.2700 
This Table presents summary statistics non-financial and non-utility American firms 
with institutional investor presence. It includes three panels: Full sample, Firms with 
institutional investor presence, and firms without institutional investor presence. The 
variables are Tobin’s Q; Capital expenditures as a percent of total assets; R&D 
expenditures as a percent of Total Assets; Percentage of shares outstanding owned by 
institutional investors; Herfindahl-style concentration index measuring the concentration 
of ownership; and the percent of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 
institutional investors in that firm. 
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics for industries with top 10 institutional investor presence
sic2 N.Obs Q
Capital 
Expenditures as 
% of Total 
Assets
R&D 
Expenditures 
as a % of 
Total Assets Total Assets
%  Shares 
owned by 
Institutional 
Investors
Herf 
Concentration
% Shares 
owned by Top 
5 Institutional 
Investors
Full Sample 40 Transportation, Railroad 168 1.1410 1.6479% 0.0000% 20748.1637 29.6903% 0.0134 11.8635%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 40 97 1.0434 1.5862% 0.0000% 21682.6373 0.0041% 0.0000 0.0038%
High Institutional Investor Presence 40 71 1.2029 1.7210% 0.0000% 19550.4582 70.2474% 0.0318 28.0661%
Full Sample 56 Retail, Apparel and Accessiories 752 1.8404 1.9276% 0.0000% 955.9978 26.1693% 0.0122 11.3847%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 56 482 1.6024 1.8574% 0.0000% 844.4503 0.7914% 0.0006 0.7337%
High Institutional Investor Presence 56 270 2.2281 2.0477% 0.0000% 1153.4782 71.4735% 0.0329 30.3986%
Full Sample 52 Retail, Building Materials 98 2.4641 1.8941% 0.0000% 1865.4175 25.9506% 0.0072 8.3341%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 52 66 1.2378 1.8609% 0.0000% 907.4569 0.1440% 0.0000 0.1436%
High Institutional Investor Presence 52 32 4.4184 1.9512% 0.0000% 3721.4662 79.1766% 0.0221 25.2269%
Full Sample 41 Transportation, Local Highway Transportation 125 1.4272 1.4592% 0.0000% 1272.8437 22.0358% 0.0118 11.0928%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 41 87 1.2207 2.0946% 0.0000% 1377.4414 0.7793% 0.0002 0.6815%
High Institutional Investor Presence 41 38 1.7904 0.3087% 0.0000% 1049.8856 70.7020% 0.0383 34.9292%
Full Sample 31 Leather 150 1.7618 0.6903% 0.1734% 341.9866 21.7016% 0.0088 10.1393%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 31 111 1.2055 0.5999% 0.1272% 272.9433 3.5240% 0.0013 3.1819%
High Institutional Investor Presence 31 39 3.0061 0.9312% 0.3050% 538.4944 73.4381% 0.0302 29.9412%
Full Sample 46 Pipelines 164 1.4693 1.5357% 0.0000% 1541.2090 21.2695% 0.0112 12.5260%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 46 97 1.3600 1.6916% 0.0000% 1568.0530 1.9837% 0.0003 1.0929%
High Institutional Investor Presence 46 67 1.5656 1.3287% 0.0000% 1502.7459 49.1909% 0.0270 29.0784%
Full Sample 72 Personal Services 224 1.8782 1.4024% 0.4442% 272.1014 20.7947% 0.0128 12.2683%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 72 150 2.1194 1.2968% 0.6634% 248.8352 0.7844% 0.0003 0.6833%
High Institutional Investor Presence 72 74 1.4774 1.6046% 0.0000% 318.6340 61.3563% 0.0379 35.7515%
Full Sample 16 Heavy Construction 427 4.0652 1.3381% 0.0571% 792.2295 19.5744% 0.0101 9.2280%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 16 309 5.2827 1.3542% 0.0541% 786.1199 0.8451% 0.0003 0.7667%
High Institutional Investor Presence 16 118 1.5981 1.3011% 0.0649% 808.1766 68.6198% 0.0356 31.3850%
Full Sample 26 Paper and Allied Products 1262 3.7428 1.0640% 0.3913% 2507.5058 19.1944% 0.0103 9.4817%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 26 917 4.9643 1.1144% 0.4981% 2449.0025 0.9754% 0.0004 0.8097%
High Institutional Investor Presence 26 345 1.1805 0.9444% 0.1075% 2659.9536 67.6202% 0.0366 32.5317%
Full Sample 42 Transportation, Motor Freight Transportation 672 1.5881 2.1193% 0.0000% 3263.0117 18.8460% 0.0077 8.6932%
No/Low Institutional Investor Presence 42 475 1.5452 1.5707% 0.0000% 2519.3186 0.9313% 0.0004 0.8681%
High Institutional Investor Presence 42 197 1.6793 3.4086% 0.0000% 5052.4052 62.0414% 0.0254 27.5608%
This Table presents summary statistics for the top 10 industries of non-financial and non-utility American firms with institutional investor presence. It breaks the full sample statistics for each industry into firm-level 
classifications based on the level of institutional ownership. The variables are Tobin’s Q; Capital expenditures as a percent of total assets; R&D expenditures as a percent of Total Assets; Total Assets; Percentage of shares 
outstanding owned by institutional investors; Herfindahl-style concentration index measuring the concentration of ownership; and the percent of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 institutional investors in that firm.
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3.3 Models 
First I explore how institutional investors impact investments during the crisis periods.  As I am 
interested in how institutional investors impact investments during crisis periods, I include 
interaction terms which capture this effect.  I run variations of the following model using the 
institutional investor and investment variables discussed above. 
Investment = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Q +  𝛽3Liquidity +   𝛽4Salesgrowth + 𝛽5Volume +  𝛽6Fincrisis  
+ 𝛽7Econcrisis +  𝛽8Fincrisis x InstInv + 𝛽9Econcrisis x InstInv 
“InstInv” is an abbreviation for the institutional investor variables defined in the previous 
section. 
 In addition, I investigate why institutional investors may actively influence investment 
behavior during crisis periods by exploring how a change in investments impacts firm 
performance, as measured by Q, during crisis periods.  I run the following model. 
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Investments +  𝛽3Leverage +   𝛽4Log(Total Assets) +  
𝛽5Fincrisis  + 𝛽6Econcrisis +  𝛽7Fincrisis x Investment + 𝛽8Econcrisis x Investment 
Last, I investigate how institutional investors impact firm performance during crisis 
periods.  I am interested in the effects provided by my interaction terms “crisis period x 
institutional investor.” 
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Investments +  𝛽3Leverage +   𝛽4Log(Total Assets) +  
𝛽5Fincrisis  + 𝛽6Econcrisis +  𝛽7Fincrisis x InstInv + 𝛽8Econcrisis x InstInv 
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3.4 Dataset 
My data consists of quarterly data of firms obtained from Compustat covering the period 
between the first quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of 2009. My data begins in 2003 to 
avoid the 2001 dotcom bubble and subsequent recovery. I delete all firms which do not have at 
least 1 year (4 quarters) of data. I gather institutional investor information from Thomson 
Reuters for the firms listed on Compustat.  Thomson Reuters contains ownership information by 
institutional managers with $100million or more in assets under management as reported on 
Form 13F with the SEC.  I delete observations that are financial firms or utility companies 
because they are subjected to different operating and reporting restrictions.  In addition, the 
financial industry is the center of the financial crisis, so I expect their business fundamentals to 
change more dramatically and earlier than other firms during the financial crisis period.  I also 
delete duplicate observations of firms undergoing a shift in fiscal calendar. These duplicate 
observations are deleted if the observation being reported is not for the current calendar period of 
the report. Next, I delete observations where institutional ownership is greater than 100% due to 
database errors. Next, I match institutional investor firms with non-institutional investor firms 
based on industry and size. Last, I winsorize the institutional ownership variables at the top and 
bottom 1% level.  This leaves me with a total of 127,735 observations across 9,206 firms.   
4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this paper, I look at two different types of long term investments: capital expenditures and 
R&D expenditures.  Both types of long term investments are believed to improve a firm’s long-
run value, but they could affect value very differently during a period of macroeconomic 
financial distress (McConnell and Muscarella, 1985; Chung, Wright and Charoenwong, 1998; 
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Jaffee, 1986; Boulding and Staelin, 1995).  Because of their differences, I look at how 
institutional investors affect capital expenditures and R&D investments separately. 
4.1 Capital Expenditures 
Capital expenditures are used to purchase new assets or update old assets which will help make 
the business more efficient and profitable shortly after installation.  In addition, if the capital 
purchased is deemed a failure, that is it does not ultimately benefit the firm, the firm could re-sell 
the physical property and recoup some of its losses.  Because of the nature of capital 
expenditures, they are considered to be less-risky than other forms of long term investments.  It 
is not immediately clear if capital expenditures would improve or hurt firm value during a 
recession.  Capital expenditures could immediately benefit firms by improving efficiency, so 
how this investment effects firm value to investors depends on which carries more weight: the 
cost to acquire the capital or the benefit from its purchase?  As capital expenditures have low risk 
and could potentially improve short term firm value, institutional investors are less opposed to 
this type of long run investment during periods of economic uncertainty. As a result, capital 
expenditures are a good choice when studying how institutional investors affect investments 
during the liquidity squeeze of the financial crisis.   
Since institutional investors help mitigate financial constraints (Agca and Mozumdar, 
2008; Alvarez et al., 2016; Schain and Stieble, 2016; Ismail and Krishnaswami, 2017 working 
paper; Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Denis and Milhov, 2002; Berger and Udell, 1998, then 
intuition suggests that when liquidity is squeezed, firms with greater institutional investor 
presence are affected by the credit crunch on a significantly smaller scale. Thus, I posit the 
mitigation of financial constraints by institutional investors allows firms with greater institutional 
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investor presence to continue financing their long-term investments, while their peers must 
decrease their investments on a greater scale. That is, I expect to observe 
1. Firms with higher levels of institutional investor presence show less variation in capital 
investments from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period relative to their peers with low- and 
no- institutional investor presence. 
I find that, in the pre-crisis period, there is a negative relationship between institutional investors 
and capital expenditures. In addition, capital expenditures generally increase during the financial 
crisis period and decrease during the economic crisis period.  The effect of institutional investors 
on capital expenditures during the crisis periods is sensitive to the model employed. The OLS 
model does not find any difference in capital expenditures during the crisis periods among 
institutional investor levels or concentration.   
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Table 3
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 0.0150 84.6497 * 0.0152 78.3334 * 0.0150 84.5793 *
Dumhi -0.0014 -3.9252 *
Dumii4 -0.0005 -4.7193 *
PercIi -0.0022 -4.0864 *
Q 0.0000 0.7544 0.0000 0.7365 0.0000 0.7619
Liquidity 0.0020 5.4284 * 0.0021 5.5100 * 0.0020 5.4412 *
Salesgrowth 0.0025 12.1627 * 0.0025 12.1007 * 0.0025 12.1464 *
Volatility 0.0000 -0.1663 0.0000 -0.2685 0.0000 -0.1693
Fincrisis 0.0018 4.4285 * 0.0019 4.2047 * 0.0018 4.3265 *
Econcrisis -0.0019 -4.1001 * -0.0020 -3.8965 * -0.0020 -4.1523 *
Fincrisis*dumhi 0.0006 0.6731
Econcrisis*dumhi 0.0011 1.0946
Fincrisis*dumii4 0.0001 0.2215
Econcrisis*dumii4 0.0003 0.9664
Fincrisis*percii 0.0012 0.8926
Econcrisis*percii 0.0018 1.1866
R-Square 0.0035 0.0036 0.0035
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% 
and 4 equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net 
income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the 
changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in 
sales from previous quarter.
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After controlling for industry effects, I find a weakly positive relationship between 
institutional investors and capital expenditures.  While the general trend is to decrease capital 
expenditures during the economic crisis, firms with higher institutional investor presence and 
concentration decrease their capital expenditures on a significantly smaller scale relative to low- 
and no- institutional investor firms. This finding is consistent with institutional investors 
providing liquidity benefits to the firms in which they invest: as the economy slows, firms with 
greater institutional investor presence are better able to continue to fund their investments.  
However, because this occurs during the economic crisis period, it is more likely that this 
behavior is a result of monitoring.  That is, we find that institutional investors moderate 
Table 4
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 0.0151 88.2327 * 0.0152 84.3180 *
Herf -0.0524 -5.6832 *
C5 -0.0070 -6.1771 *
Q 0.0000 0.7029 0.0000 0.6952
Liquidity 0.0020 5.4552 * 0.0021 5.5819 *
Salesgrowth 0.0025 12.1304 * 0.0025 12.0467 *
Volatility 0.0000 -0.2130 0.0000 -0.2963
Fincrisis 0.0018 4.6592 * 0.0018 4.3857 *
Econcrisis -0.0018 -4.0077 * -0.0019 -3.9477 *
Fincrisis*herf 0.0187 0.9172
Econcrisis*herf 0.0199 0.8902
Fincrisis*c5 0.0018 0.6968
Econcrisis*c5 0.0028 0.9244
R-Square 0.0038 0.0039
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the 
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = 
(Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = 
standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by 
assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter.
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decreases in capital expenditure during the the economic crisis rather than the financial crisis.  
The financial crisis is a period of contained declining liquidity where problems were limited to 
the banking system. The economic crisis period is plagued by declining business fundamentals 
and falling investment quality resulting in a broad decrease in investments.  However, 
institutional investors alleviate declining firm health and actively monitor firm decisions to 
ensure managers continue investing at efficient levels.  As a result, I conclude that my industry 
fixed effects findings are most consistent with monitoring hypothesis. 
 
 
Table 5
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Dumhi 0.0006 1.8426 ***
Dumii4 0.0002 1.6765 ***
PercIi 0.0007 1.4904
Q 0.0000 1.4117 0.0000 1.4186 0.0000 1.3997
Liquidity -0.0006 -1.7457 *** -0.0006 -1.7499 *** -0.0006 -1.7388 ***
Salesgrowth 0.0019 10.2248 * 0.0019 10.2273 * 0.0019 10.2230 *
Volatility 0.0000 0.2411 0.0000 0.2747 0.0000 0.2360
Fincrisis 0.0004 0.9499 0.0003 0.6822 0.0003 0.8942
Econcrisis -0.0038 -8.7869 * -0.0040 -8.5782 * -0.0039 -9.0119 *
Fincrisis*dumhi 0.0004 0.5061
Econcrisis*dumhi 0.0014 1.6109
Fincrisis*dumii4 0.0002 0.7243
Econcrisis*dumii4 0.0005 2.0701 **
Fincrisis*percii 0.0008 0.6368
Econcrisis*percii 0.0029 2.0817 **
R-Square 0.1715 0.1716 0.1716
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% 
and 4 equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net 
income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the 
changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in 
sales from previous quarter.
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Last, I employ the Heckman model to see if there is a self-selection bias.  For the 
institutional investor presence model, the lambda coefficient (the coefficient of the Inverse Mills 
Ratio) is barely statistically different than zero at the 10% level indicating selectivity is not 
strong.   This suggests that the more appropriate model is one which does not control for 
selection bias, such as fixed effects.  However, the institutional investor concentration model 
shows that self-selection is present.  Institutional investors choose to be more concentrated the 
higher the Q value and the lower the Financial Constraints, but they do not choose to increase 
concentration based on capital expenditure behavior.  In the second stage, we find that 
institutional investor concentration has no effect on capital expenditure behavior during the crisis 
periods. 
Table 6
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Herf -0.0033 -0.3911
C5 0.0004 0.3960
Q 0.0000 1.4113 0.0000 1.4176
Liquidity -0.0005 -1.5606 -0.0006 -1.6289
Salesgrowth 0.0019 10.1293 * 0.0019 10.1644 *
Volatility 0.0000 0.1324 0.0000 0.1798
Fincrisis 0.0004 1.0695 0.0004 0.9478
Econcrisis -0.0037 -8.9719 * -0.0039 -8.7898 *
Fincrisis*herf 0.0091 0.4920
Econcrisis*herf 0.0308 1.5044
Fincrisis*c5 0.0011 0.4749
Econcrisis*c5 0.0049 1.7741 ***
R-Square 0.1714 0.1715
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the 
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = 
(Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = 
standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by 
assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter.
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For institutional investor presence, the most appropriate model is the industry fixed effects 
model, and it provides evidence that firms with higher levels of institutional investor presence 
show less variation in capital investments from the pre-crisis period to the economic crisis period 
Table 7
Estmate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept -3.5989 -77.2737 * -2.0786 -87.8275 *
Lag (Dumsp500) 0.4077 9.4504 * 0.2981 7.6803 *
Lag (CapEx) 0.0000 -0.5735 0.0000 -0.7478
Lag (Q) 0.0092 6.8407 * 0.0021 2.5807 *
Lag (Saindex) -0.7890 -52.3246 * -0.4526 -54.9726 *
Intercept 0.0154 4.2659 * 0.0238 12.3655 *
DumHi 0.0017 0.6737
DumC5hi -0.0033 -3.2452 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 0.0037 0.7783
Econcrisis * Dumhi 0.0067 1.5943
Fincrisis * DumC5hi -0.0034 -1.3101
Econcrisis * DumC5hi 0.0000 -0.0029
Fincrisis  -0.0011 -0.2434 0.0049 2.0316 **
Econcrisis  -0.0036 -0.9244 -0.0008 -0.2742
Q 0.0005 1.3616 0.0002 2.7752 *
Liquidity 0.0212 4.0662 * 0.0068 4.4869 *
Salesgrowth 0.0018 1.6374 0.0023 3.9953 *
Volatility 0.0015 1.6152 -0.0005 -1.3907
Lambda -0.0028 -1.8798 *** -0.0057 -4.5503 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(DumC5hi)
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag (Dumhi)
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = CapEx
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors is in the top 50%, otherwise Dumhi equals 0.  Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 institutional investors is in the top 50%, otherwise 
Dumc5hi equals 0.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 
if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / 
total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard 
deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items 
divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter. Sa-Index is a proxy for 
financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). DumSP500 is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the firm is included in the S&P500 for that quarter, otherwise it equals 0. The first stage variables 
are lagged by 1 year.
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relative to their peers with low- and no- institutional investor presence. This finding is consistent 
with institutional investors monitoring the firms in which they invest: as the economy slows, 
firms with greater institutional investor presence continue to efficiently fund their investments.   
It is generally accepted that long-term capital investments improve efficiency and 
profitability which increases firm value to investors. If capital investments do not expect to have 
these benefits, then it is unlikely that the manager would purchase the asset. Thus, I expect to 
find that if firms which maintain their long-term capital investments during the financial crisis 
are better able to maintain their firm value.  
2. Firms which increase (do not decrease) their capital investments during the financial 
crisis have lower variation in performance from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. 
All models show that a change in capital investments during the crises periods do not 
result in any change in performance.  Thus, continuing to invest in capital improves firm value 
even during crisis periods.  This demonstrates that institutional investors are incentivized to 
encourage firms to maintain their capital investments during economic downturns. 
32 
 
 
Table 8
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.9071 74.3214 * 7.7771 72.9131 * 7.9626 74.7725 *
Dumhi 1.9755 14.6136 *
Dumii4 0.3882 10.1737 *
PercII 3.5454 16.7341 *
CapEx 10.4898 7.3593 * 10.2966 7.2183 * 10.6306 7.4604 *
Leverage 4.2708 276.5320 * 4.2783 277.1634 * 4.2641 275.8286 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5571 -71.7926 * -1.5221 -70.2324 * -1.5877 -72.1684 *
Fincrisis -1.2348 -7.9880 * -1.2314 -7.9615 * -1.2269 -7.9395 *
Econcrisis -1.8823 -10.8566 * -1.8809 -10.8413 * -1.8699 -10.7881 *
Fincrisis * CapEx 0.7894 0.2436 0.7991 0.2465 0.8646 0.2669
Econcrisis * CapEx -0.3688 -0.0922 -0.3252 -0.0812 -0.3474 -0.0868
R-Square 0.5500 0.5495 0.5503
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4 
equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market 
value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total 
assets.
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
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Table 9
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.8567 73.8340 * 7.8415 73.7018 *
Herf 25.9825 7.9037 *
C5 4.3399 10.2547 *
CapEx 10.0711 7.0609 * 10.3294 7.2407 *
Leverage 4.2804 277.3028 * 4.2781 277.1505 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.4878 -70.7884 * -1.5162 -70.6602 *
Fincrisis -1.2544 -8.1087 * -1.2487 -8.0739 *
Econcrisis -1.9198 -11.0655 * -1.9063 -10.9900 *
Fincrisis * CapEx 0.7396 0.2281 0.7846 0.2420
Econcrisis * CapEx -0.2641 -0.0659 -0.2836 -0.0708
R-Square 0.5493 0.5495
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. 
Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value 
of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current 
debt) / total assets.
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Table 10
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Dumhi 2.1611 15.8662 *
Dumii4 0.4503 11.6852 *
PercII 3.8866 18.1894 *
CapEx 6.3294 4.1864 * 6.3038 4.1670 * 6.3488 4.2008 *
Leverage 4.2519 271.7574 * 4.2596 272.3869 * 4.2442 271.0027 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.6410 -70.0298 * -1.6070 -68.6106 * -1.6757 -70.5776 *
Fincrisis -1.2859 -8.3230 * -1.2791 -8.2746 * -1.2790 -8.2816 *
Econcrisis -1.9800 -11.4080 * -1.9725 -11.3577 * -1.9694 -11.3512 *
Fincrisis * CapEx 1.0422 0.3221 1.0473 0.3235 1.1241 0.3476
Econcrisis * CapEx 0.2312 0.0579 0.2457 0.0615 0.2730 0.0684
R-Square 0.5524 0.5519 0.5527
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 
4 equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market 
value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / 
total assets.
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Table 11
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Herf 29.6141 8.9514 *
C5 4.9787 11.6596 *
CapEx 6.3425 4.1914 * 6.3662 4.2082 *
Leverage 4.2626 272.5873 * 4.2598 272.4107 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5646 -68.7733 * -1.5985 -68.9240 *
Fincrisis -1.3024 -8.4222 * -1.2993 -8.4051 *
Econcrisis -2.0114 -11.5790 * -2.0019 -11.5282 *
Fincrisis * CapEx 0.9442 0.2916 1.0199 0.3151
Econcrisis * CapEx 0.2545 0.0637 0.2853 0.0714
R-Square 0.5516 0.5519
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional 
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the 
firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long 
term debt + current debt) / total assets.
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
35 
 
 
Last, if institutional investors mitigate financial constraints allowing firms to continue 
investing during the financial crisis, then I expect to see the value of institutional investor 
presence increase during the crisis period. 
3. Firms with higher levels of institutional investors have greater performance relative to 
low- and no- institutional investor presence during the crisis period. 
Using the OLS and Industry Fixed Effects model, I find a positive coefficient on the 
crises-institutional investor interaction coefficient indicating the presence of institutional 
Table 12
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept -3.4744 -78.5912 * -1.9345 -89.2155 *
Lag(Dumsp500) 0.3933 9.0977 * 0.2693 6.9897 *
Lag(adjcapxyq 0.0000 -0.6004 0.0000 -0.7747
Lag(Q) 0.0097 8.4736 * 0.0032 5.1755 *
Lag(Saindex) -0.7563 -52.4216 * -0.4240 -55.5036 *
Intercept -0.3254 -0.5225 8.3919 11.2024 *
Dumhi 0.4770 3.2618 *
DumC5hi -0.3180 -1.5013
CapEx 1.6422 1.0673 7.2020 2.7277 *
Fincrisis 0.0426 0.3896 -0.3792 -1.7119 ***
Econcrisis -0.5801 -4.8467 * -1.3596 -5.5214 *
Fincrisis * CapEx -2.9512 -0.9311 3.3989 0.6001
Econcrisis * CapEx 1.2072 0.3771 2.9038 0.4310
Leverage 0.5471 4.8817 * 4.2381 109.7055 *
Log(Total Assets) -0.0696 -1.6805 *** -0.8084 -16.1912 *
Lambda 1.3331 5.6127 * -2.5837 -5.8742 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag (DumHi)
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(DumC5Hi)
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by 
institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of 
total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dum5hi 
equals 0.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the 
period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm 
to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term 
debt + current debt) / total assets.
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investors mitigates market and growth losses that are characteristic of the financial and economic 
crisis periods.    
 
Table 13
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.9606 74.9633 * 7.8831 73.4918 * 8.0210 75.4257 *
Dumhi 1.6432 10.6733 *
Dumii4 0.2638 6.0772 *
PercII 3.0013 12.4679 *
Fincrisis -1.4624 -9.2383 * -1.6619 -9.6888 * -1.4602 -9.2283 *
Econcrisis -2.1508 -11.9222 * -2.3642 -12.1578 * -2.1634 -11.9844 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 1.2382 3.4669 *
Econcrisis * Dumhi 1.4003 3.3595 *
Fincrisis * Dumii4 0.4680 4.6281 *
Econcrisis * Dumii4 0.5246 4.4648 *
Fincrisis * Percii 1.9600 3.5691 *
Econcrisis * Percii 2.3594 3.6640 *
CapEx 10.5780 8.7223 * 10.3997 8.5683 * 10.7353 8.8544 *
Leverage 4.2716 276.5938 * 4.2791 277.2449 * 4.2649 275.8955 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5551 -71.6951 * -1.5194 -70.1146 * -1.5858 -72.0833 *
R-Square 0.5501 0.5497 0.5504
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
OLS MODEL
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4 
equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market 
value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total 
assets.
Dependent Variable = Q
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Table 14
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.8898 74.4410 * 7.9019 74.3093 *
Herf 18.9231 4.8916 *
C5 3.1959 6.5264 *
Fincrisis -1.4052 -9.1657 * -1.5025 -9.3618 *
Econcrisis -2.0743 -11.8668 * -2.2009 -12.0169 *
Fincrisis * Herf 24.8186 2.8748 *
Econcrisis *  Herf 23.2256 2.3841 **
Fincrisis * C5 3.9627 3.6074 *
Econcrisis * C5 4.4146 3.4577 *
CapEx 10.1619 8.3731 * 10.4254 8.5878 *
Leverage 4.2810 277.3392 * 4.2791 277.2138 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.4856 -70.6570 * -1.5132 -70.4987 *
R-Square 0.5494 0.5496
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dependent Variable = Q
OLS MODEL
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the percentage 
of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of 
market value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term 
debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 15
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Dumhi 1.8173 11.7421 *
Dumii4 0.3225 7.3779 *
PercII 3.3261 13.7338 *
Fincrisis -1.5164 -9.5814 * -1.7177 -10.0183 * -1.5136 -9.5686 *
Econcrisis -2.2532 -12.4750 * -2.4665 -12.6694 * -2.2678 -12.5497 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 1.2723 3.5680 *
Econcrisis * Dumhi 1.4663 3.5235 *
Fincrisis * Dumii4 0.4799 4.7541 *
Econcrisis * Dumii4 0.5436 4.6342 *
Fincrisis * Percii 2.0004 3.6488 *
Econcrisis * Percii 2.4654 3.8354 *
CapEx 6.5063 4.9845 * 6.4693 4.9537 * 6.5402 5.0124 *
Leverage 4.2531 271.8338 * 4.2609 272.4920 * 4.2454 271.0874 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.6383 -69.9122 * -1.6035 -68.4664 * -1.6731 -70.4693 *
R-Square 0.5525 0.5521 0.5529
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dependent Variable = Q
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% 
and 4 equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio 
of market value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + 
current debt) / total assets.
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After correcting for selection bias using the Heckman model, I confirm a positive 
relationship between institutional investor concentration and Q in the pre-crisis period and the 
economic crisis period.  However, no statistically significant difference was found during the 
financial crisis period.  That is, institutional investors provide some kind of market value and 
growth advantage during periods broad deteriorating economic environment that followed.  This 
is consistent with institutional investors monitoring firms to ensure they are financing their 
operations and investments to maximize firm value.    
Table 16
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Herf 22.4844 5.7864 *
C5 3.8103 7.7337 *
Fincrisis -1.4498 -9.4575 * -1.5528 -9.6774 *
Econcrisis -2.1623 -12.3540 * -2.2997 -12.5414 *
Fincrisis * Herf 24.8124 2.8780 *
Econcrisis *  Herf 23.7590 2.4422 **
Fincrisis * C5 4.0097 3.6558 *
Econcrisis * C5 4.5750 3.5888 *
CapEx 6.5174 4.9884 * 6.5452 5.0112 *
Leverage 4.2634 272.6307 * 4.2611 272.4866 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5618 -68.6291 * -1.5947 -68.7416 *
R-Square 0.5517 0.5520
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional 
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of 
the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = 
(long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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In summary, I do not find evidence using the investments conduit that institutional 
investors provide liquidity to firms.  However, I do find evidence that institutional investors 
actively monitor investments as a mechanism to maximize firm value.  I find that firms generally 
decrease capital expenditures during the economic crisis, but firms with higher institutional 
investor presence do not decrease their capital expenditures to the magnitude of firms with low- 
and no- institutional investor presence. This finding is consistent with institutional investors 
Table 17
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept -3.4744 -78.5912 * -1.9345 -89.2155 *
Lag (Dumsp500) 0.3933 9.0977 * 0.2693 6.9897 *
Lag (CapEx) 0.0000 -0.6004 0.0000 -0.7747
Lag (Q) 0.0097 8.4736 * 0.0032 5.1755 *
Lag (Saindex) -0.7563 -52.4216 * -0.4240 -55.5036 *
Intercept -0.2425 -0.3810 8.4243 11.2519 *
Dumhi 0.4192 2.1424 **
DumC5hi -0.5800 -2.4059 **
Fincrisis -0.4631 -1.2677 -1.0674 -1.9789 **
Econcrisis -0.4681 -1.5447 -2.5825 -3.8766 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 0.4954 1.3065
Econcrisis * Dumhi -0.1201 -0.3696
Fincrisis * DumC5hi 0.8696 1.4955
Econcrisis * DumC5hi 1.4413 2.0306 **
Leverage 0.5494 4.9026 * 4.2360 109.6120 *
Log (Total Assets) -0.0712 -1.7189 *** -0.7991 -15.9565 *
CapEx 1.2859 1.0542 8.2043 3.7377 *
Lambda 1.3234 5.5720 * -2.4896 -5.6396 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors is in the top 50%.  Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares 
outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dum5hi equals 0.  
Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of 
assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) 
/ total assets.
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent 1st Stage Dependent 
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
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providing monitoring services to the firms in which they invest: as the economy slows, firms 
with greater institutional investor presence ensure managers continue to fund firm investments at 
a rate which maximized firm value.  In addition, I find that capital expenditures improve firm 
value, and this does not change during the crisis period; as a result, institutional investors have 
incentive to monitor that managers do not dramatically decrease their investment expenditures.  
Last, I find that institutional investor presence helps mitigate crisis period losses, which is again 
consistent with my monitoring hypothesis.  If institutional investors encourage the firms in which 
they invest to continue investing in assets which improve efficiency and minimize costs, they 
better able maintain firm value during crisis periods.  
4.2 Research and Development Expenditures 
       In addition to capital expenditures, I also look at whether institutional investors impact R&D 
during the financial crisis.  Unlike capital expenditures where the product of the costs is a 
tangible good, the product of research and development expenditures is often knowledge or 
technology.  In addition, much of the cost of R&D is wages to researchers who are exploring and 
developing these new ideas which are not immediately profitable.  It can take months or years 
for a product to come to fruition from the R&D expenditures; improving short term earnings are 
not the goal with these investments.  In addition, if the research hits a proverbial road block, or 
the firm loses a researcher, there is no ability to recover losses.  Because of this, R&D 
investments are considered to be much riskier.  During a recession, increasing R&D will not 
immediately benefit a firm, however, it could have long term benefits.  Counter-cyclical 
literature suggests that firms increase R&D during a “down-cycle” because it allows a firm to 
redefine their competitive advantage (Dugal and Morbey, 1995) as well as take advantage of 
falling opportunity costs due to decreases in profitability  (Franko, 1989;  Hall, 1991; Caballero 
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and Hammour, 1991).  That is, as profitability falls, the opportunity cost of investments—or the 
sales or profits that could have been realized if funds were appropriated in the direction of 
production instead of investment—also falls making R&D investments relatively cheaper. In 
short, firms take extra risks by increasing R&D during the down-cycle in hopes it will bring 
them greater long term profitability. 
While investing in R&D during a down-cycle has long term benefits, the risk and the 
long period to recover costs may cause institutional investors to hesitate increasing these 
investment expenditures during periods of uncertainty.  Due to the risk associated with R&D 
investments as well as the counter-cyclical behavior associated with them, using research and 
development to explore if institutional investors provide liquidity to firms during the financial 
crisis is a bit murkier.  If R&D is generally increasing during the financial crisis due to the 
counter-cyclical behavior of firms, then I would expect firms with greater institutional investor 
presence, and thus more relaxed financial constraints, to increase their R&D expenditures even 
more.   
4. Firms with high levels of institutional investor presence increase (do not decrease) their 
R&D more than firms with low- or no- institutional investor presence. 
However, if I find that R&D is generally increasing during the financial crisis but firms 
with greater institutional investor presence do not increase their R&D to the same extent, then 
monitoring by institutional investors is the dominant effect, and the liquidity theory is left 
unresolved. 
In my OLS and Fixed Effects models, I find a negative relationship between institutional 
investors and research and development expenditures.  R&D expenditures tend to increase 
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during both the financial crisis and economic crisis, but firms with high institutional investor 
ownership do not experience the same growth in investment intensity in the economic crisis 
period. As a result, the wedge driven between the R&D expenditures of firms with high 
institutional investor presence and all other firms becomes larger.  These results are weakly 
echoed with the institutional investor concentration variables. 
 
Table 18
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 0.0146 50.5741 * 0.0144 45.6142 * 0.0148 51.3981 *
Dumhi -0.0025 -4.4197 *
Dumii4 -0.0004 -2.4489 **
PercII -0.0055 -6.2632 *
Q 0.0002 8.8052 * 0.0002 8.7914 * 0.0002 8.8209 *
Liquidity -0.0338 -55.8698 * -0.0340 -56.0575 * -0.0337 -55.7126 *
Salesgrowth 0.0041 12.3919 * 0.0041 12.4948 * 0.0041 12.2853 *
Volatility -0.0003 -5.7878 * -0.0003 -5.7007 * -0.0003 -5.8768 *
Fincrisis 0.0034 5.0683 * 0.0031 4.2883 * 0.0034 5.1061 *
Econcrisis 0.0050 6.5884 * 0.0051 6.0769 * 0.0049 6.4081 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi -0.0014 -1.0046
Econcrisis * Dumhi -0.0042 -2.6093 *
Fincrisis * Dumii4 -0.0001 -0.1960
Econcrisis * Dumii4 -0.0009 -2.0221 **
Fincrisis * PercII -0.0023 -1.0706
Econcrisis * PercII -0.0055 -2.2616 **
R-Square 0.0823 0.0798 0.0806
*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = R&D
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investos where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4 
equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in 
quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from 
previous quarter.
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Table 19 
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 0.0143 51.4113 * 0.0144 49.0994 *
Herf -0.0441 -2.9356 *
C5 -0.0060 -3.2153 *
Q 0.0002 8.7715 * 0.0002 8.7677 *
Liquidity -0.0340 -56.2097 * -0.0339 -56.0553 *
Salesgrowth 0.0041 12.5373 * 0.0041 12.4690 *
Volatility -0.0003 -5.6391 * -0.0003 -5.7086 *
Fincrisis 0.0030 4.7280 * 0.0031 4.5866 *
Econcrisis 0.0043 5.8477 * 0.0047 6.1014 *
Fincrisis * Herf 0.0057 0.1713
Econcrisis * Herf -0.0200 -0.5502
Fincrisis * C5 -0.0005 -0.1185
Econcrisis * C5 -0.0080 -1.6283
R-Square 0.0798 0.0799
*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dependent Variable = R&D
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional 
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, 
Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income 
before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous 
quarter.
OLS MODEL
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Table 20
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Dumhi -0.0022 -3.9480 *
Dumii4 -0.0004 -2.4745 **
PercII -0.0044 -5.1893 *
Q 0.0001 7.5626 * 0.0001 7.5440 * 0.0001 7.5851 *
Liquidity -0.0295 -51.0236 * -0.0296 -51.1541 * -0.0294 -50.9121 *
Salesgrowth 0.0030 9.5773 * 0.0030 9.6466 * 0.0030 9.5090 *
Volatility -0.0002 -3.8214 * -0.0002 -3.7635 * -0.0002 -3.8872 *
Fincrisis 0.0037 5.7411 * 0.0034 4.9251 * 0.0037 5.8146 *
Econcrisis 0.0058 7.9253 * 0.0059 7.4366 * 0.0057 7.8878 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi -0.0007 -0.5694
Econcrisis * Dumhi -0.0040 -2.6372 *
Fincrisis * Dumii4 0.0000 0.0972
Econcrisis * Dumii4 -0.0010 -2.2714 **
Fincrisis * PercII -0.0014 -0.6942
Econcrisis * PercII -0.0060 -2.5697 **
R-Square 0.1708 0.1705 0.1710
*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dependent Variable = R&D
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investos where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4 
equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in 
quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from 
previous quarter.
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
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However, the most appropriate model to view is the Heckman model which controls for 
selection bias.  Unlike the capital expenditures models where very weak selection bias was 
found, there is strong presence of self-selection in the R&D model.   
After correcting for selection bias using the Heckman model, it appears that the negative 
relationship between institutional investors and R&D investments that was reported in the OLS 
and Fixed effects models stems from a self-selection issue.  Using the Heckman model, I find a 
positive relationship between institutional investor concentration and R&D expenditures in the 
first stage indicating that the likelihood of institutional investor concentration increases with 
greater R&D expenditures.   In the second stage equations, I find that R&D increases during the 
financial crisis, but firms with high institutional investor presence do not increase their R&D 
Table 21
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Herf -0.0341 -2.3721 **
C5 -0.0054 -3.0520 *
Q 0.0001 7.5302 * 0.0001 7.5243 *
Liquidity -0.0297 -51.3377 * -0.0296 -51.1670 *
Salesgrowth 0.0031 9.7029 * 0.0030 9.6327 *
Volatility -0.0002 -3.6790 * -0.0002 -3.7609 *
Fincrisis 0.0033 5.4521 * 0.0034 5.2633 *
Econcrisis 0.0051 7.3153 * 0.0056 7.5338 *
Fincrisis * Herf 0.0193 0.6126
Econcrisis * Herf -0.0277 -0.7981
Fincrisis * C5 0.0011 0.2661
Econcrisis * C5 -0.0088 -1.8883 ***
R-Square 0.1704 0.1706
*denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = R&D
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the 
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis 
= 0. Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of 
assets, Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before 
extraordinary items divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter.
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expenditures to the same magnitude.  This is consistent with the OLS and Industry Fixed Effects 
models reported earlier. 
 
My results suggest that investments are a conduit through which institutional investors 
control firm value. However, I do not find evidence that institutional investors alleviate financial 
Table 22
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept -3.5810 -77.8639 * -2.0802 -89.0613 *
Lag (DumSP500) 0.4288 9.9715 * 0.3135 8.1047 *
Lag (R&D) 0.0002 0.4338 0.0000 0.3662
Lag (Q) 0.0091 6.8175 * 0.0021 2.6818 *
Lag (Saindex) -0.7768 -52.1999 * -0.4474 -55.1321 *
Intercept -0.0389 -10.2271 * -0.0549 -16.9377 *
Dumhi 0.0053 2.0588 **
DumC5Hi 0.0048 3.0650 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi -0.0156 -3.2420 *
Econcrisis * Dumhi -0.0010 -0.2235
Fincrisis * DumC5hi -0.0052 -1.3082
Econcrisis * DumC5hi 0.0044 0.9179
Fincrisis  0.0162 3.4909 * 0.0083 2.2005 **
Econcrisis  0.0022 0.5606 -0.0011 -0.2368
Q 0.0058 15.4748 * 0.0003 2.9638 *
Liquidity -0.1018 -19.1149 * -0.0578 -24.9836 *
Salesgrowth 0.0042 3.7197 * 0.0076 8.6624 *
Volatility 0.0010 1.0759 -0.0009 -1.8589 ***
Lambda 0.0207 13.1261 * 0.0470 22.2835 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(DumC5Hi)
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag (DumHi)
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = R&D
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors is in the top 50%, otherwise Dumhi equals 0.  Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the 
percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 institutional investors is in the top 50%, otherwise 
Dumc5hi equals 0.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 
if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / 
total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, Volatility = standard 
deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals income before extraordinary items 
divided by assets, and Salesgrowth = percent change in sales from previous quarter. Sa-Index is a proxy for 
financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). DumSP500 is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the firm is included in the S&P500 for that quarter, otherwise it equals 0. The first stage variables 
are lagged by 1 year.
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constraints allowing the firms in which they invest to maintain or increase investments during 
periods of economic crisis.  While the practice by institutional investor firms to not significantly 
increase investments in the manner of other firms exhibits investment smoothing behavior, it is 
not in the pattern consistent with improved liquidity.  If this was a liquidity problem, then I 
would see institutional investor firms increasing (or not decreasing) their investments while all 
other firms were forced to decrease investment expenditures. Instead, it appears that institutional 
investors monitor the investment intensity of firms to maximize short term value during crises. 
   Institutional investors likely monitor R&D investments during crisis periods for two 
reasons: 1) the presence of institutional investors ensures managers are consistently investing 
efficiently and thus any increase in investments when opportunity costs fall would result in 
overinvestment (investment beyond the efficient level) and thus a decrease in value. 2) 
institutional investors encourage managers to mitigate short-term losses in firm value by not 
increasing R&D expenditures. Increasing R&D during the financial crisis may increase long-run 
performance, but it will likely not increase firm value in the short period.  In fact, increasing 
R&D during a crisis period may result in a decrease in short-term value since it directly 
negatively affects earnings and increases risk.  Either way, both explanations indicate 
institutional investors monitor R&D investments, and I expect to find that if firms increase their 
R&D investments during the financial crisis, they will have worse crisis period firm value than 
the institutional investor firms which do not increase their R&D investments to the same extent.  
Otherwise, institutional investors would not encourage firms to maintain (not increase) their 
R&D investments. 
5. Firms which increase their R&D investment expenditures during the financial crisis have 
lower performance for the crisis period. 
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The OLS and industry fixed effects models show that, while R&D is generally positively 
related to Q value, firms which have high R&D expenditures during the economic crisis 
experience worse declines in Q relative to their peers. 
 
 
 
Table 23
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.6721 72.2686 * 7.5571 71.1046 * 7.7247 72.6855 *
Dumhi 1.8235 13.6506 *
Dumii4 0.3468 9.1949 *
PercII 3.3249 15.8601 *
R&D 12.9978 14.2246 * 13.0149 14.2337 * 12.9895 14.2206 *
Leverage 4.2849 282.8127 * 4.2915 283.3833 * 4.2787 282.1526 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.4990 -69.9704 * -1.4670 -68.3765 * -1.5281 -70.3889 *
Fincrisis -0.8761 -5.9881 * -0.8737 -5.9685 * -0.8663 -5.9229 *
Econcrisis -1.4187 -8.4927 * -1.4168 -8.4760 * -1.4048 -8.4118 *
Fincrisis * R&D -16.9569 -8.6387 * -16.9870 -8.6497 * -17.0156 -8.6712 *
Econcrisis * R&D -23.8379 -12.0170 * -23.8948 -12.0398 * -23.9073 -12.0557 *
R-Square 0.5520 0.5516 0.5523
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% 
and 4 equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio 
of market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current 
debt) / total assets.
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
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Table 24
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.6206 71.7987 * 7.6109 71.7232 *
Herf 25.1612 7.7428 *
C5 3.9735 9.5020 *
R&D 13.1515 14.3858 * 13.0796 14.3077 *
Leverage 4.2929 283.4941 * 4.2913 283.3724 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.4396 -69.1615 * -1.4625 -68.9222 *
Fincrisis -0.8955 -6.1173 * -0.8887 -6.0715 *
Econcrisis -1.4498 -8.6749 * -1.4379 -8.6044 *
Fincrisis * R&D -16.9732 -8.6416 * -16.9888 -8.6508 *
Econcrisis * R&D -23.9229 -12.0525 * -23.9185 -12.0521 *
R-Square 0.5515 0.5516
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. 
C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - 
Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= 
Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
OLS MODEL
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Table 25
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Dumhi 2.0885 15.5091 *
Dumii4 0.4335 11.3755 *
PercII 3.7981 17.9530 *
R&D 15.1570 15.8947 * 15.1131 15.8400 * 15.1884 15.9339 *
Leverage 4.2641 277.6490 * 4.2712 278.2265 * 4.2569 276.9370 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5893 -69.0744 * -1.5589 -67.6706 * -1.6230 -69.6753 *
Fincrisis -0.9438 -6.4526 * -0.9372 -6.4038 * -0.9349 -6.3942 *
Econcrisis -1.5191 -9.0934 * -1.5110 -9.0396 * -1.5062 -9.0195 *
Fincrisis * R&D -17.2555 -8.8112 * -17.3028 -8.8305 * -17.3265 -8.8508 *
Econcrisis * R&D -24.0703 -12.1615 * -24.1321 -12.1863 * -24.1526 -12.2078 *
R-Square 0.5547 0.5543 0.5551
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  
Dumii4 classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the 
bottom 25% and 4 equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 
0.  Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = 
(long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Table 26
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Herf 30.5199 9.3295 *
C5 4.8896 11.5796 *
R&D 15.1723 15.8991 * 15.1724 15.9028 *
Leverage 4.2735 278.4009 * 4.2712 278.2515 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5220 -67.9682 * -1.5515 -68.0640 *
Fincrisis -0.9618 -6.5704 * -0.9565 -6.5363 *
Econcrisis -1.5488 -9.2649 * -1.5381 -9.2028 *
Fincrisis * R&D -17.2711 -8.8126 * -17.2950 -8.8268 *
Econcrisis * R&D -24.1500 -12.1929 * -24.1548 -12.1980 *
R-Square 0.5541 0.5543
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership structure. C5 is the percentage 
of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of 
market value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt 
+ current debt) / total assets.
52 
 
When using Heckman 2SLS to explore how investments affect Q-value, I confirm my OLS and 
Industry Fixed Effects Results.  I find that an increase in R&D investments during both crisis 
periods results in a further decline in Q.  Bringing all my R&D results together, I find that firms 
generally tend to increase R&D during the financial crisis, but firms with greater institutional 
investor presence decrease R&D.  Institutional investors prefer their firms to not increase R&D 
during crisis periods because R&D decreases value during this period. 
 
Table 27
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept -3.4484 -79.3264 * -1.9246 -90.4742 *
Lag(Dumsp500) 0.4158 9.6564 * 0.2781 7.2574 *
Lag(adjcapxyq) 0.0002 0.4127 0.0000 0.3001
Lag(Q) 0.0096 8.5713 * 0.0031 5.0719 *
Lag(Saindex) -0.7419 -52.3004 * -0.4188 -55.9540 *
Intercept 0.9597 1.4882 9.7246 12.8312 *
Dumhi 0.4497 2.9800 *
DumC5hi -0.4212 -2.0186 **
R&D 9.2065 6.9054 * 14.0080 8.1166 *
Fincrisis 0.0179 0.1704 0.0146 0.0677
Econcrisis -0.5538 -4.6642 * -0.9621 -3.9434 *
Fincrisis * R&D -4.4807 -1.9733 ** -17.0063 -5.2845 *
Econcrisis * R&D -2.5583 -0.9407 -21.4691 -6.4078 *
Leverage 0.4550 3.8695 * 4.2036 107.7976 *
Log(Total Assets) -0.1210 -2.8515 * -0.8398 -16.9160 *
Lambda 0.6983 2.8262 * -3.4869 -7.7685 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag (DumHi)
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(DumC5Hi)
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by 
institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dumhi equals 0.  Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 
1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 
50%, else Dum5hi equals 0.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. 
Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of 
market value of the firm to book value of assets, CapEx= Quarterly Capital Expenditures / Total Assets, and 
Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Last, if institutional investors monitor R&D investments during the crisis period and 
encourage firms to maintain (not increase) their expenditures to mitigate crisis period losses, then 
I expect to see the value of institutional investor presence increase during the crisis period. 
6. Firms with higher levels of institutional investors have better performance relative to 
low- and no- institutional investor presence during the crisis period. 
Using OLS and Fixed Effects regressions, I find that as Q declines in the financial and 
economic crisis periods, firms with high institutional investor presence or concentration perform 
better than their peers.  Firms which had greater institutional investor presence or concentration 
enjoy mitigated crisis period losses.  After correcting for selection bias, I confirm that 
institutional investor concentration (but not presence in general) alleviates crisis period losses. 
This is consistent with monitoring theory because they greater an investors’ position in the firm, 
the more incentive the investor has to monitor. 
In summary, my results indicate that R&D investments are a conduit through which 
institutional investors control firm value.  However, I do not find evidence that institutional 
investors alleviate financial constraints allowing the firms in which they invest to maintain or 
increase R&D expenditures during periods of financial crisis.  Instead, it appears that 
institutional investors monitor the R&D investment intensity of firms to maximize short term 
value during crises.  That is, when the economy is constricted, institutional investors encourage 
their firms to maintain (not increase) R&D expenditures which helps to reduce crisis period 
performance losses. 
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Table 28
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.8934 74.3512 * 7.8337 73.1612 * 7.9513 74.7724 *
Dumhi 1.4833 9.7265 *
Dumii4 0.2174 5.0561 *
PercII 2.7652 11.5813 *
Fincrisis -1.4790 -9.5156 * -1.6874 -10.0065 * -1.4771 -9.5027 *
Econcrisis -2.2616 -12.7925 * -2.4815 -13.0047 * -2.2703 -12.8296 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 1.2385 3.4855 *
Econcrisis * Dumhi 1.4739 3.5589 *
Fincrisis * Dumii4 0.4756 4.7358 *
Econcrisis * Dumii4 0.5452 4.6770 *
Fincrisis * Percii 1.9567 3.5746 *
Econcrisis * Percii 2.4423 3.8072 *
R&D 6.0380 8.0811 * 6.0312 8.0659 * 6.0012 8.0348 *
Leverage 4.2792 282.4672 * 4.2858 283.0539 * 4.2730 281.8077 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5021 -70.0631 * -1.4693 -68.4408 * -1.5311 -70.4794 *
R-Square 0.5514 0.5510 0.5516
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4 
equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market 
value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total 
assets.
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
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Table 29
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept 7.8199 73.8012 * 7.8394 73.7668 *
Herf 18.3828 4.7937 *
C5 2.8036 5.7797 *
Fincrisis -1.4073 -9.3407 * -1.5131 -9.6002 *
Econcrisis -2.1668 -12.6434 * -2.3045 -12.8417 *
Fincrisis * Herf 22.3870 2.6091 *
Econcrisis *  Herf 22.2821 2.3195 **
Fincrisis * C5 3.8836 3.5555 *
Econcrisis * C5 4.5312 3.5800 *
R&D 6.1457 8.2211 * 6.0838 8.1385 *
Leverage 4.2870 283.1151 * 4.2857 283.0239 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.4425 -69.2300 * -1.4644 -68.9469 *
R-Square 0.5508 0.5509
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
OLS MODEL
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional 
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of 
the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = 
(long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
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Table 30
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Dumhi 1.7363 11.3218 *
Dumii4 0.2997 6.9219 *
PercII 3.2184 13.3921 *
Fincrisis -1.5598 -10.0398 * -1.7704 -10.5052 * -1.5585 -10.0317 *
Econcrisis -2.3833 -13.4758 * -2.6064 -13.6540 * -2.3956 -13.5339 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 1.2623 3.5593 *
Econcrisis * Dumhi 1.5469 3.7426 *
Fincrisis * Dumii4 0.4864 4.8534 *
Econcrisis * Dumii4 0.5698 4.8973 *
Fincrisis * Percii 1.9883 3.6398 *
Econcrisis * Percii 2.5736 4.0206 *
R&D 8.0682 10.1517 * 8.0032 10.0650 * 8.0713 10.1596 *
Leverage 4.2592 277.3193 * 4.2663 277.9233 * 4.2519 276.6109 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5899 -69.0347 * -1.5585 -67.5955 * -1.6235 -69.6314 *
R-Square 0.5540 0.5536 0.5544
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors is in the top 50%.  Dumii4 
classifies firms into quartiles based on the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by instituitonal investors where 1 equals the bottom 25% and 4 
equals the top 25%.  Percii is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional investors.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market 
value of the firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total 
assets.
Dependent Variable = Q
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Table 31
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Herf 23.7098 6.1542 *
C5 3.6937 7.5637 *
Fincrisis -1.4795 -9.8222 * -1.5904 -10.0945 *
Econcrisis -2.2767 -13.2775 * -2.4251 -13.5073 *
Fincrisis * Herf 22.0650 2.5758 *
Econcrisis *  Herf 22.8649 2.3843 **
Fincrisis * C5 3.8955 3.5729 *
Econcrisis * C5 4.7245 3.7399 *
R&D 8.0377 10.1056 * 8.0467 10.1197 *
Leverage 4.2682 278.0286 * 4.2664 277.9167 *
Log (Total Assets) -1.5226 -67.9103 * -1.5509 -67.9549 *
R-Square 0.5533 0.5536
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
Dependent Variable = Q
Herf is a herfindahl-style index to measure the concentration of institutional investors in the ownership 
structure. C5 is the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional 
investors. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Q equals the ratio of market value of the 
firm to book value of assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long 
term debt + current debt) / total assets.
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS MODEL
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I use investments to explore how institutional investors affect liquidity during the 
Global Financial Crisis while also investigating how institutional investors monitor investments 
to maximize firm value.  My results are most consistent with Monitoring Hypothesis during the 
economic crisis period where institutional investor presence promotes efficient levels of 
Table 32
Estimate T-Value Estimate T-Value
Intercept -3.4484 -79.3264 * -1.9246 -90.4742 *
Lag (Dumsp500) 0.4158 9.6564 * 0.2781 7.2574 *
Lag (R&D) 0.0002 0.4127 0.0000 0.3001
Lag (Q) 0.0096 8.5713 * 0.0031 5.0719 *
Lag (Saindex) -0.7419 -52.3004 * -0.4188 -55.9540 *
Intercept 0.9802 1.4869 9.9062 13.0464 *
Dumhi 0.4074 2.0152 **
DumC5hi -0.6556 -2.7592 *
Fincrisis -0.5570 -1.4847 -0.7044 -1.2857
Econcrisis -0.4078 -1.2966 -2.7815 -4.3059 *
Fincrisis * Dumhi 0.5615 1.4409
Econcrisis * Dumhi -0.2162 -0.6409
Fincrisis * DumC5hi 0.4654 0.7875
Econcrisis * DumC5hi 1.5772 2.2760 **
Leverage 0.4450 3.8024 * 4.2076 107.7683 *
Log (Total Assets) -0.1184 -2.7909 * -0.8348 -16.7401 *
R&D 7.6687 7.4685 * 6.1129 4.5088 *
Lambda 0.7139 2.8924 * -3.3979 -7.5289 *
* denotes significance at the 1% level
** denotes significance at the 5% level
*** denotes significance at the 10% level
HECKMAN 2SLS MODEL
1st Stage Dependent 1st Stage Dependent 
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Dumhi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares outstanding owned by institutional 
investors is in the top 50%.  Dumc5hi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the percentage of total shares 
outstanding owned by the top 5 largest institutional investors is in the top 50%, else Dum5hi equals 0.  
Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0.  Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of 
assets, R&D= Quarterly R&D Expenditures / Total Assets, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / 
total assets.
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investments allowing institutional investor firms to maintain (not increase or decrease) their pre-
crisis investment levels.  Because of their monitoring efforts, the presence of institutional 
investors becomes more valuable during crisis periods.  This study further clarifies the role 
institutional investors play in corporate governance.  
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Appendix A 
Calculation of Control Variables 
Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets 
Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets 
Firm Size = natural log (total assets) 
Volatility = standard deviation of the changes in quarterly profit rate where profit rate equals 
income before extraordinary items divided by assets 
Salesgrowth = (salest – salest-1) / salest-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: These control variables are derived from a number of sources including Fahlenbrach 
(2004), Maury (2006), Demiralp et al. (2011), and Cho (1998). 
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Chapter 2 
“The role of dedicated investors during the financial crisis.” 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 1, I explore how institutional investors influence investments. I find that institutional 
investors monitor firm investments to maximize value during crisis periods.  I do not find 
evidence that institutional investor presence nor concentration affects liquidity through the 
investments mechanism.  In this chapter, I revisit the liquidity hypothesis by exploring it from a 
different angle.  The institutional investor variable in Chapter 1 analyzes the impact of aggregate 
shares held by institutional investors on investments; it does not consider that different types of 
institutional investors may be more likely to mitigate financial constraints or actively monitor to 
try to influence management.  It has been argued that institutional investors have better 
information and better resources (Pound, 1988) and thus are better able to perceive value of 
impending projects and provide capital when debt and cash flows dry up (Hanley and Wilhelm, 
1995; Chemmanur et al., 2009; Krishnaswami et al.,1999).  However, not all institutional 
investors are created equal.  It is generally accepted that long-term institutional investors are 
more likely to spend resources accumulating knowledge about the firms in which they invest 
giving them a better advantage to facilitate capital and actively monitor. Short-term, momentum 
institutional investors are not incentivized to collect information, and they are more likely to sell 
upon information than try to incite any change.  As a result, breaking down my aggregate 
institutional investor variable from my first essay into types of institutional investors may yield 
improved results.   
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In this chapter, I explore how dedicated, long term investors impact investments and 
performance during the financial crisis. Institutional investors can affect investments by 
providing both liquidity and monitoring services to their firms. Thus, I test whether long term 
investors ease financial constraints during the financial crisis allowing firms to maintain their 
investments, as well as if long term investors are more likely to use investments as a mechanism 
to maximize firm value. If institutional investors reduce financial constraints, then I would 
expect to see a firms with greater institutional investor presence do not decline capital 
investments as much as their peers during the credit crunch.  Because R&D is counter-cyclical in 
behavior, I expect to see that that firms with greater institutional investor presence are able to 
increase their R&D expenditures by a greater amount during the credit crisis than their more 
financially constrained peers.   If this is the case, then I can conclude that investments are one 
channel through which increased liquidity manifests.  If long-term institutional investors provide 
greater monitoring services, then I assume that firms with greater dedicated investor presence 
will be operating at efficient levels of investments in the pre-crisis period, and thus any change in 
investment would result in inefficiencies and reduced firm value. Thus, I expect to find that if 
monitoring is strong, firms with greater dedicated investor presence will maintain value-
maximizing investment levels during the crisis periods while their peers have significant changes 
in investment behavior which result in decreases in firm value.  This would result in dedicated 
investors becoming more valuable during crisis periods. 
Using financial and economic crisis dummy variables, I find weak evidence that dedicated 
investors monitor investments which improves firm value.  This topic is of importance because it 
follows recent literature exploring how ownership structure affects business activities, which can 
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in turn have long-lasting effects on firm performance.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Past literature suggests that institutional investors can support firms in achieving efficient 
investment levels.  One way institutional investors can encourage efficient firm-level investing is 
by facilitating capital. When internal funds and credit dry up, it is hard for firms to maintain their 
optimal investment levels. Institutional investors can step in to fill this void. In Chapter 1, I do 
not find evidence through the investments mechanism that institutional investors provide 
liquidity to the firms in which they invest.  However, diverse types of institutional investors are 
incentivized to take different actions (Lang and McNichols, 1997).  For example, Ismail and 
Krishnaswami (2017 working paper) find that institutional investors alleviate financial 
constraints, and this effect is predominantly driven by long-term (dedicated) investors.  In this 
paper, I explore whether a specific institutional investor type is better at providing firms with 
liquidity than its peers. This paper is a direct fallout from Chapter 1 and is motivated by the 
behavior of different investors.  Bushee (1998) shows that long-term investors are more 
incentivized to gather information and monitor firms while short-term traders tend to be 
momentum traders with little incentive to monitor. If a long-term investor is more 
knowledgeable about a project and deems it valuable, I expect they will be more willing to 
provide capital to the firm when other financing avenues are constrained.  
Another way institutional investors can influence efficient investment behavior is by 
decreasing information asymmetries and actively encouraging action through the value-adding 
monitoring services they provide (Pound, 1988; Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986 and 
1997; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Black, 1992; Smith, 1996; Strickland, Wiles, and Zennery, 
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1996; Wahal, 1996).   Chapter 1 results indicate that during recessions, the value-added benefit 
of institutional investor presence becomes even greater.  I find that during recessions, the 
difference between the value of Q for high institutionally owned firms and low/no institutionally 
owned firms increases, and one mechanism through which institutional investors improve firm 
value is investments.  During crisis periods, capital expenditures continue to add value at the 
same pre-crisis rate while R&D investments deteriorate performance.  Thus, institutional 
investors encourage their firms to maintain its efficient, pre-crisis investments levels; that is, they 
encourage firms to uphold capital expenditures levels and not to increase R&D expenditures.  As 
a result, the presence of institutional investors becomes more valuable.  In this paper, I explore if 
the results found in Chapter 1 are driven by a certain type of investor.  Bushee (1998) classifies 
traders based on three types: dedicated, transient and quasi-indexers.  He reports that long-term 
institutional investors with information and the ability to monitor managers incentivizes 
managers to choose R&D levels which maximize long-run value rather than short-term goals.  
However, as the presence of short-term, transient institutional investors increases, the likelihood 
that managers decrease R&D to cover a decline in earnings increases.  Chen, Harford and Li 
(2007) confirm these results when they investigate how different types of institutional investors 
influence decisions. They find that firms benefit from having independent, long-term institutions 
in their ownership structure as they provide value-added monitoring services. Almazan, Hartzell 
and Starks (2000) find that institutional investors reduce executive compensation.  Almazan, 
Hartzell and Starks (2005) conclude that certain types of institutional investors, namely those 
which have low monitoring costs like independent investment advisors and investment company 
managers, provide monitoring benefits. As you can see, different types of investors are 
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incentivized to collect information which results in varying levels of liquidity and monitoring 
services provided across investor classifications. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATASET 
3.1 Estimation Procedure 
I borrow my methodology from my first essay.  I use OLS, Industry Fixed Effects and Heckman 
2SLS with instrumental variables to investigate how institutional investor types affect 
investments and firm value during crisis periods.  Using these various regression models allows 
me to correct for omitted variable bias and self-selection bias associated with my variables of 
interest.   
 
3.2 Variables 
I explore the relationship between institutional investor types, investment behavior and firm 
value during crisis periods.  I measure performance, investments, and crisis periods similar to my 
first essay. I measure performance as the value of Tobin’s Q.  Q measures growth opportunities 
and is calculated as the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.   I measure 
investment by looking at two very different types of investments: capital expenditures and 
research and development expenditures.  Capital expenditures are quarterly expenditures on 
physical assets that enhance efficiency and current processes thereby lowering costs and 
increasing profits.  Though expensive, this type of investment has little risk as the physical asset 
can be sold to recoup losses.  R&D expenditures are quarterly expenditures on activities that help 
acquire knowledge and develop technologies.  These investments help create new competitive 
advantages and promote long term growth, but they can take years to implement.  Furthermore, 
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because the product of R&D is not a tangible good, it is hard to recover any losses in the event of 
failure.  These characteristics make R&D a riskier type of investment.  Last, I create two dummy 
variables which denote the financial crisis and economic crisis periods similar to Kuppaswamy 
and Villalonga (2015).  The financial crisis covers the period between the 4th quarter of 2007 
through the 3rd quarter of 2008, while the economic crisis covers the 4th quarter of 2008 through 
the 2nd quarter of 2009.  
However, this essay differs because I am looking at how investor types influence 
investments and firm value.  In my first essay, I look at aggregate institutional investor variables; 
in this essay, I utilize Bushee’s (1998) investor classification.  I break my institutional investor 
variable into types of investors: Dedicated, Transient and Quasi-indexer.  I explore how 
Dedicated and Transient investors impact investments during crisis periods. To do so, I create a 
dummy variables which indicate if a firm is in the top 2 quartiles of its respective group. For 
example, Dedicated equals 1 if the number of dedicated institutional investors is in the top two 
quartiles, otherwise Dedicated equals zero.  Transient equals 1 if the number of transient 
institutional investors is in the top two quartiles, otherwise Transient equals zero.  I also explore 
if my results are sensitive to the definition of high Dedicated and Transient investor presence by 
grouping them based on the top two quintiles instead.  My results are the same, so I only report 
my findings using the quartile grouping. 
I do not explore Quasi-Indexers because the nature of these investors does not incite 
change in firm behavior:  they hold relatively small amount in any one firm thus there is little 
incentive to monitor, and they do not to sell at news because they hold these indexes for long 
periods of time.  In addition, the percentage of shares owned by quasi-indexers in any one firm is 
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much smaller than the percentage of shares owned by dedicated and transient investors.  
 
 
 
When breaking institutional investor firms down based on investor type, I find that firms with 
high transient investor presence own approximately 48% of the shares owned by institutional 
investors compared to the average presence of 27%.  In addition, for high transient investor 
firms, dedicated investors only own roughly 42% of the institutionally owned shares compared to 
the 61% average.   For firms with high dedicated investor presence, dedicated investors own 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Investor Firms
MIN MAX MEAN STD
Q 0.23 281.11 3.44 10.15
CapEx -13.89% 29.01% 1.51% 3.38%
R&D -18.91% 60.43% 1.81% 5.70%
Total Assets 0.00 310328.00 2390.81 12642.56
% shares owned by 
institutional investors 0.00% 99.19% 32.90% 32.45%
Herf Concentration 0.00 0.16 0.02 0.02
% institutional shares owned 
by top 5 institutional 
investors 0.00% 67.48% 17.14% 15.05%
% shares owned by 
Transient  institutional 
investors 0.00 100.00% 27.38% 28.00%
% shares owned by 
Dedicated institutional 
investors 0.00 100.00% 61.07% 30.41%
Volatility 0.00 59.80 0.44 2.92
Liquidity -7.70 0.26 -0.05 0.35
Leverage 0.00 40.07 0.63 1.83
Salesgrowth -1.00 489.58% 8.06% 50.04%
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approximately 87% of firms owned by institutional investors compared to the average of 61%.  
Transient presence is small for firms with very high dedicated investor presence; transient 
investors own only an average of 10% of the institutionally owned shares for these firms. 
 
 
 
3.3 Models 
First I explore how institutional investors impact investments during the crisis periods.  As I am 
interested in how institutional investor types impact investments during crisis periods, I include 
interaction terms which capture this effect.  I run variations of the following model using the 
institutional investor and investment variables discussed above. 
Investment = α +𝛽1InvType + 𝛽2Q +  𝛽3Liquidity +   𝛽4Salesgrowth + 𝛽5Volume +  𝛽6Fincrisis  
+ 𝛽7Econcrisis +  𝛽8Fincrisis x InvType + 𝛽9Econcrisis x InvType 
Table 2
Period Frequency Q CapEx R&D Transient Dedicated
No/Low-Transient Pre-Crisis 16782 4.0072 0.0140 0.0160 0.0602 0.7987
No/Low-Transient Financial Crisis 2992 4.3918 0.0163 0.0203 0.0631 0.8098
No/Low-Transient Economic Crisis 2217 3.5606 0.0131 0.0197 0.0700 0.7930
High-Transient Pre-Crisis 16557 3.0310 0.0161 0.0181 0.4853 0.4227
High-Transient Financial Crisis 3354 2.4423 0.0177 0.0223 0.4814 0.4197
High-Transient Economic Crisis 2124 2.2042 0.0126 0.0248 0.4540 0.4586
Period Frequency Q CapEx R&D Transient Dedicated
No/Low-Dedicated Pre-Crisis 17550 3.0382 0.0156 0.0180 0.4399 0.3729
No/Low-Dedicated Financial Crisis 3380 2.7296 0.0179 0.0231 0.4582 0.3624
No/Low-Dedicated Economic Crisis 2100 2.4229 0.0128 0.0259 0.4252 0.3802
High-Dedicated Pre-Crisis 15789 4.0616 0.0145 0.0159 0.0901 0.8707
High-Dedicated Financial Crisis 2966 4.0951 0.0160 0.0194 0.0978 0.8651
High-Dedicated Economic Crisis 2241 3.3442 0.0129 0.0186 0.1102 0.8522
Means of High Dedicated Firms Across Periods
Means of High Transient Firms Across Periods
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“InvType” could measure either Dedicated or Transient investors as defined in the previous 
section. 
 In addition, I investigate why institutional investors may actively influence investment 
behavior during crisis periods by exploring how a change in investments impacts firm 
performance, as measured by Q, during crisis periods.  I run the following model. 
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1InstInv + 𝛽2Investments +  𝛽3Leverage +   𝛽4Log(Total Assets) +  
𝛽5Fincrisis  + 𝛽6Econcrisis +  𝛽7Fincrisis x Investment + 𝛽8Econcrisis x Investment 
Last, I investigate how institutional investors impact firm performance during crisis 
periods.  I am interested in the effects provided by my interaction terms “crisis period x 
institutional investor.” 
Tobin’s Q = α +𝛽1 InvType + 𝛽2Investments +  𝛽3Leverage +   𝛽4Log(Total Assets) +  
𝛽5Fincrisis  + 𝛽6Econcrisis +  𝛽7Fincrisis x InvType + 𝛽8Econcrisis x InvType 
 
The control variables used for each model are collected from previous literature. 
 
3.4 Dataset 
The dataset for this essay differs from my first essay in one major way: I restrict the sample 
to include only firms with institutional investor presence.  That is, if a firm has no institutional 
investor presence in its ownership structure, I delete that firm from my sample.  This creates a 
sample bias because Thomson Reuters only contains ownership information by institutional 
managers with $100million or more in assets under management as reported on Form 13F with 
the SEC.  Thus, I may be excluding firms with small institutional investor presence from my 
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sample.  However, in this essay, I am trying to explore if a specific investor type drives the 
results found in my first essay.  I feel that the sample bias associated with restricting the sample 
is small compared to the benefit of reducing the noise coming from firms without institutional 
investor presence. 
The rest my data consists of quarterly firm data obtained from Compustat covering the period 
between the first quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of 2009.  I delete all firms which do 
not have at least 1 year (4 quarters) of data or that are in the financial or utility industries because 
they are subjected to different operating and reporting restrictions.  I also delete duplicate 
observations of firms undergoing a shift in fiscal calendar. Last, I winsorize the institutional 
ownership variables at the top and bottom 1% level.   
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
4.1 Institutional investor type and investments 
I look at two different types of long term investments separately: capital expenditures and R&D 
expenditures.  Because capital investments have relatively quick payoffs and are less risky, 
dedicated investors are likely not encouraged to incite a change in capital investment behavior 
during crisis periods.  However, R&D is a riskier type of investments because the product of 
research and development expenditures is often knowledge or technology. Because of this, there 
is much secrecy around its development, and it takes a long period of time to acquire the 
knowledge/technology then an even longer time to develop it into a profitable venture for the 
firm. In addition, if the firm decides to change direction in the research, or the firm loses a 
researcher, there is no ability to recover losses.  Because of these characteristics, I expect 
investors to be more averse to R&D, especially during periods of increasing financial constraint. 
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Because of the differing natures of these investments, institutional investors approach them 
differently, and so I investigate them individually in my paper. 
 
4.1.1 Capital Expenditures 
If dedicated investors mitigate financial constraints, then the firms in which they invest are better 
able to maintain their capital investments in crisis periods.  I expect to find that 
 
1. Firms with greater dedicated institutional investor presence do not decrease their capital 
investments from the pre-crisis period to the financial crisis period more than their peers. 
 
However, as institutional investors can use investments as a tool to monitor firm behavior, we 
may observe monitoring behavior instead.  If this result is observed during the economic crisis 
where falling investment quality is dispersed across the economy and we are no longer in a true 
liquidity crunch, then this finding strengthens the monitoring theory argument.  
 When using OLS and Industry Fixed Effects methods, I find that firms with high 
transient investor presence decrease their capital expenditures in the economic crisis period more 
than other firms which have other types of institutional investor presence. Because this 
observation occurs in the economic crisis where business fundamentals are plagued by falling 
business fundamentals and asset prices, it does not strengthen the liquidity argument.  Instead, 
these results show that transient investors do not monitor as tightly as their peers and thus, 
transient investors are not the driving factor behind the monitoring behavior found in Chapter 1.   
The not significant coefficient on the dedicated investors variable shows that capital expenditures 
for dedicated firms do not change during the crisis period; this indicates that firms with greater 
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dedicated investor presence are monitored to maintain their capital expenditure behavior even 
during crisis periods.   
 
 
 
Table 3
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept 0.0109 13.6441 * 0.0098 12.7876 *
Dedicated -0.0009 -2.0780 **
Transient 0.0017 4.1233 *
Fincrisis 0.0017 2.4372 ** 0.0023 3.1122 *
Econcrisis -0.0026 -3.0342 * -0.0010 -1.2071
Fincrisis * Dedicated 0.0001 0.1435
Econcrisis * Dedicated 0.0008 0.6801
Fincrisis * Transient -0.0011 -1.0750
Econcrisis * Transient -0.0025 -2.0795 **
SA-Index -0.0017 -6.8963 * -0.0017 -6.6189 *
Liquidity 0.0024 3.2596 * 0.0024 3.2258 *
Q 0.0001 5.2145 ** 0.0001 5.1202 *
R-Square 0.0032 0.0035
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else Fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else Econcrisis = 
0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
Dependent Variable = CapEx
OLS Model
79 
 
 
 
When I use Heckman 2SLS, I find that self-selection bias is present for both the dedicated and 
transient models.  The characteristics investors use to choose the firms in which they invest 
affect capital expenditures (ie: financial constraints and/or growth opportunities), but investors 
do not directly select firms based on capital expenditures levels.   Because there is a selection 
bias present, the best model to use is Heckman 2SLS.  When using this model, I find similar 
results, but the power is significantly reduced.  If you recall, the sample includes only firms with 
institutional investors, and so each firm likely has both dedicated and transient investors present 
pulling the firm in opposite directions.  When adding the correction for selection bias, the 
explanatory power of either type of investor is diminished. 
Table 4
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Dedicated -0.0006 -1.5520
Transient 0.0017 4.5499 *
Fincrisis 0.0000 0.0677 0.0008 1.2717
Econcrisis -0.0041 -5.3444 * -0.0023 -3.0178 *
Fincrisis * Dedicated 0.0004 0.4433
Econcrisis * Dedicated 0.0012 1.1105
Fincrisis * Transient -0.0013 -1.3654
Econcrisis * Transient -0.0026 -2.4215 **
SA-Index -0.0004 -1.5730 -0.0003 -1.1688
Liquidity -0.0002 -0.2991 -0.0002 -0.3352
Q 0.0000 1.7830 *** 0.0000 1.6649 ***
R-Square 0.1865 0.1869
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else Fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else Econcrisis = 0. 
Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
Dependent Variable = CapEx
Industry Fixed Effects Model
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In summary, I find evidence that firms with greater dedicated institutional investor presence 
maintain capital investment expenditures during the economic crisis period while less monitored, 
high transient investor firms decrease their capital expenditures.  This finding is consistent with 
monitoring theory. 
Table 5
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept 0.4048 9.5650 * -0.8178 -18.7785 *
Lag (Dumsp500) 0.4352 7.8072 * -0.6453 -11.2544 *
Lag (CapEx) -0.2175 -0.7164 0.5382 1.7600 ***
Lag (Q) -0.0023 -1.9680 ** 0.0037 2.8924 *
Lag (SA-Index) 0.1760 12.0519 * -0.2588 -17.2531 *
Intercept -0.0038 -0.8000 0.0562 6.8722 **
Dedicated -0.0025 -2.1353 **
Transient 0.0037 3.0403 *
Fincrisis  0.0015 0.6320 0.0021 0.8509
Econcrisis  0.0004 0.1116 0.0008 0.3148
Fincrisis * Dedicated 0.0016 0.5629
Econcrisis * Dedicated 0.0011 0.3163
Fincrisis * Transient -0.0013 -0.4685
Econcrisis * Transient -0.0040 -1.4320
SA-Index -0.0007 -0.8408 0.0013 1.1060
Liquidity -0.0003 -0.2276 -0.0002 -0.1150
Q 0.0000 0.6038 0.0001 0.8011
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.0220 3.0344 * -0.0459 -7.3632 *
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Heckman 2SLS Model
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(Dedicated)
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = CapEx
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0.  Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-
Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag (Transient)
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4.1.2 Research and Development Expenditures 
Next, I explore how institutional investors impact R&D investments during the financial and 
economic crisis periods.  Because R&D investments are counter-cyclical (Hall, 1991; Caballero 
and Hammour, 1991; Lopez-Garcia, 2012), I expect to find that firms with high dedicated 
institutional investor presence are less financially constrained and thus are able to increase their 
R&D expenditures more than their peers. 
 
2. Firms with greater dedicated institutional investor presence do not decrease their capital 
investments from the pre-crisis period to the financial crisis period more than their peers. 
 
When using the OLS model, I find that institutional investor type has no effect on R&D 
expenditures.  However, the OLS model does not correct for any endogeneities that are likely 
present.  When using the industry fixed effects model, I find weak evidence that dedicated 
investors monitor firms to not increase their R&D investments.  Looking at Table 7, you observe 
that the general trend is to increase R&D expenditures during both the financial and economic 
crisis periods.  However, the negative coefficient on the interaction term suggest that institutional 
investors increase their R&D investments less than their peers.  Firm which high levels of 
transient investors, which are less likely to be monitored, increase their R&D expenditures by a 
greater amount than their peers.  These findings are consistent with monitoring theory. 
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Table 6
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept 0.0620 49.3048 * 0.0555 45.9196 *
Dedicated -0.0071 -10.8939 *
Transient 0.0078 11.9342 *
Fincrisis  0.0038 3.5232 * 0.0030 2.6021 *
Econcrisis  0.0047 3.4669 * 0.0024 1.8673 ***
Fincrisis * Dedicated -0.0003 -0.2082
Econcrisis * Dedicated -0.0018 -0.9883
Fincrisis * Transient 0.0010 0.6131
Econcrisis * Transient 0.0021 1.1499
SA-Index 0.0149 37.4871 * 0.0151 38.0676 *
Liquidity -0.0476 -41.4794 * -0.0477 -41.6327 *
Q -0.0004 -11.0364 * -0.0005 -11.3405 *
R-Square 0.1614 0.1622
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. 
Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + 
depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
Dependent Variable = R&D
OLS Model
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When I employ Heckman 2SLS, I find that dedicated investors do not have a prominent selection 
bias, but transient investors do.  Transient investors do not pick firms based on R&D levels, but 
they do pick firms which have high Q values.  Firms with higher Q value tend to invest less in 
R&D, and thus transient investors have an indirect selection bias on R&D firms.  Dedicated 
investors do not pick firms based on current performance, and thus no selection bias is present.  
The Heckman 2SLS model, the most appropriate model when selection bias is present, shows 
that there is no difference in investment levels for firms with high transient presence.  For firms 
with dedicated investor presence, it is most appropriate to refer back to the industry fixed effects 
results. 
     
Table 7
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Dedicated -0.0049 -7.8951 *
Transient 0.0057 9.2506 *
Fincrisis  0.0053 5.1445 * 0.0039 3.6137 *
Econcrisis  0.0059 4.6800 * 0.0026 2.0928 **
Fincrisis * Dedicated -0.0013 -0.8615
Econcrisis * Dedicated -0.0032 -1.8002 ***
Fincrisis * Transient 0.0012 0.7838
Econcrisis * Transient 0.0032 1.8288 ***
SA-Index 0.0106 26.3336 * 0.0109 26.9090 *
Liquidity -0.0437 -40.1924 * -0.0438 -40.2803 *
Q -0.0003 -7.0494 * -0.0003 -7.3193 *
R-Square 0.2572 0.2578
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two quintiles, else 
Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis 
= 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as 
intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the ratio of market value 
of the firm to book value of assets.
Dependent Variable = R&D
Industry Fixed Effects Model
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4.2 Investment behavior and Q-value 
My next question stems from my previous results. Why do dedicated institutional investors 
monitor R&D and Capital investment differently?  Why do I find that capital investments tend to 
Table 8
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept -0.5210 -17.3430 * -1.2813 -37.5231 *
Lag (Dumsp500) 0.3789 7.6462 * -0.5012 -9.5802 *
Lag (R&D) -0.0002 -0.7700 -0.0001 -1.0080
Lag (Q) 0.0002 0.2881 0.0043 5.0544 *
Lag (SA-Index) -0.0358 -3.3842 * -0.3288 -27.7570 *
Intercept 0.0540 3.7705 * 0.0345 3.3655 *
Dedicated -0.0056 -3.3680 *
Transient 0.0043 2.5473 *
Fincrisis  0.0039 1.1429 0.0015 0.4369
Econcrisis  0.0023 0.5019 0.0007 0.1946
Fincrisis * Dedicated 0.0007 0.1639
Econcrisis * Dedicated 0.0021 0.3990
Fincrisis * Transient 0.0020 0.5109
Econcrisis * Transient 0.0064 1.4521
SA-Index 0.0125 13.2009 * 0.0179 12.0369 *
Liquidity -0.0463 -20.2374 * -0.0574 -20.7936 *
Q -0.0006 -7.6130 * -0.0006 -5.4987 *
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0015 -0.1288 0.0310 4.8783 *
R-Square 0.1642 0.2106
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(Dedicated)
2nd Stage Dependent Variable = R&D
Heckman 2SLS Model
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(Transient) 
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two quintiles, 
else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient investors is in the 
top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. 
Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial 
constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Liquidity = (Net income + depreciation) / total assets. Q equals the 
ratio of market value of the firm to book value of assets.
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decrease in the economic crisis period but firms with high dedicated investor presence do not 
alter their investments to the same extent as firms with high transient investor presence?  And 
why do I find that R&D expenditures tend to increase during the economic crisis, but firms with 
greater institutional investor presence do not increase their investments in the same manner?  
The effect of long term investments on firm value has been discussed in literature.  It is 
generally accepted that long-term investments increase firm value (Chung et al., 1998; Chen, 
2006) by allowing firms to innovate and cut costs, subsequently improving their competitive 
advantage. I find this to be true as well.  The positive coefficient on capital expenditures and 
R&D expenditures in the Q model shows that during normal periods, both long term investments 
increase firm value.  While investments promote long term value, it does so at the expense of 
current earnings. Furthermore, how investments affect firm value can change during different 
economic periods.  For example, Garcia (2013) documents that investor sensitivity to news is 
more pronounced during recessions. This increased sensitivity can cause firms with poor 
earnings announcements to experience dramatic losses. Thus, heightened investor sentiment can 
cause long term investments, which decrease short term earnings, to ultimately decrease firm 
value during recessions.  As a result, managers may be enticed to decrease investments which 
increases earnings and short term value during crisis periods.  However, not all investments are 
created equally.  Capital investments are less risky and increase earnings much quicker than 
R&D investments which have very little recourse and can take a long time to turn profitable. 
Thus, I expect to find that if firms which maintain their long-term capital investments during the 
financial crisis are better able to maintain their firm value, but firms which maintain R&D 
investments during the crisis periods find their firm value declines. 
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3.  Firms which increase (do not decrease) their capital investments during the financial crisis 
have lower variation in performance from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. 
4.   Firms which decrease (do not increase)  their R&D investments during the financial crisis 
have lower variation in performance from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. 
 
The results from all models support these expectations. During normal periods, both 
capital expenditures and R&D expenditures improve Q value but during the economic crisis 
period, capital investments continue to increase Q while greater R&D expenditures are 
detrimental to Q.  Since dedicated investors actively monitor firms to ensure they are 
consistently making decisions which maximize firm value, we find that dedicated institutional 
investors encourage firms to maintain their pre-crisis investment levels: they do not want to 
decrease their capital investments which still add value, and they do not want to increase their 
R&D investment levels which will cause current value to decrease.   
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Table 9
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept 9.8192 70.6230 * 9.2433 64.1786 *
CapEx 6.7176 5.5957 *
R&D 10.9501 14.6162 *
Fincrisis -0.3567 -3.2131 * -0.1406 -1.3441
Econcrisis -0.7607 -5.9182 * -0.5920 -4.8198 *
Fincrisis * CapEx 0.9963 0.3643
Econcrisis * CpEx -1.4259 -0.3988
Fincrisis * R&D -9.9883 -6.6397 *
Econcrisis * R&D -12.6970 -7.5497 *
SA-Index 3.0232 66.3425 * 2.8462 60.9697 *
Leverage 3.1700 147.7891 * 3.1602 149.7296 *
R-Square 0.5522 0.5528
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
CapEx = Capital Expenditures / Total Assets. R&D = R&D Expenditures / Total Assets.  Fincrisis = 1 
if the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls 
between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as 
intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
OLS Model
Dependent Variable = Q
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4.3 Institutional Investor Type and Q-Value 
Last, if institutional investors monitor firm decisions during the financial crisis to maximize firm 
value, then I expect to see the value of institutional investor presence increase during the crisis 
period. 
 
5. Firms with high levels of institutional investors have greater performance relative to low- 
and no- institutional investor presence during the crisis period. 
 
My ols and fixed effects models show that firms with greater transient investor presence 
perform worse than their peers during the economic crisis period while firms with greater 
Table 10
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
CapEx 3.0917 2.3894 **
R&D 12.3582 15.8767 *
Fincrisis -0.3944 -3.5643 * -0.2079 -1.9926 **
Econcrisis -0.8114 -6.3365 * -0.6474 -5.2927 *
Fincrisis * CapEx 0.5325 0.1956
Econcrisis * CpEx -1.5857 -0.4458
Fincrisis * R&D -10.3387 -6.9087 *
Econcrisis * R&D -12.9536 -7.7447 *
SA-Index 3.1181 63.7396 * 2.9423 59.5581 *
Leverage 3.1680 145.4579 * 3.1508 146.8996 *
R-Square 0.5810 0.5588
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
CapEx = Capital Expenditures / Total Assets. R&D = R&D Expenditures / Total Assets.  Fincrisis = 1 if 
the period falls between Q42007 - Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between 
Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by 
Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current debt) / total assets.
Dependent Variable = Q
Industry Fixed Effects Model
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dedicated investor presence perform better.  The results for my Heckman 2SLS tell the same 
story. While I do not get a significant change in Q for firms with greater dedicated investor 
presence, I do find that firms with greater transient investor presence suffer worse losses during 
the economic crisis period.  This implies that firms which are not monitored as tightly perform 
worse during crisis periods which is consistent with monitoring hypothesis. 
 
 
 
Table 11
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept 10.0785 69.5973 * 9.6786 69.4576 *
Dedicated -0.3546 -4.3966 *
Transient 0.5921 7.3381 *
Fincrisis -0.4236 -3.1145 * -0.2384 -1.6533 ***
Econcrisis -1.1953 -7.1452 * -0.5924 -3.6150 *
Fincrisis * Dedicated 0.2160 1.0831
Econcrisis * Dedicated 0.7467 3.1889 *
Fincrisis * Transient -0.1908 -0.9584
Econcrisis * Transient -0.4646 -1.9865 **
SA-Index 3.0169 66.7493 * 3.0396 67.0684 *
Leverage 3.1692 150.0869 * 3.1701 150.2041 *
R-Square 0.5506 0.5510
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
OLS Model
Dependent Variable = Q
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 
0. Sa-Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt 
+ current debt) / total assets.
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Table 12
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Dedicated -0.3470 -4.2782 *
Transient 0.6179 7.6044 * 0.6179 7.6044 *
Fincrisis -0.4849 -3.5758 * -0.3224 -2.2432 **
Econcrisis -1.2626 -7.5748 * -0.6284 -3.8499 *
Fincrisis * Dedicated 0.2142 1.0779
Econcrisis * Dedicated 0.7782 3.3352 *
Fincrisis * Transient -0.1503 -0.7575
Econcrisis * Transient -0.4918 -2.1105 **
SA-Index 3.1043 63.8125 * 3.1354 64.2273 *
Leverage 3.1668 147.6951 * 3.1671 147.7948 *
R-Square 0.5562 0.5567
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
Industry Fixed Effects Model
Dependent Variable = Q
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0. Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-
Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current 
debt) / total assets.
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5. CONCLUSION 
I employ regression analysis to explore how the classification of investors impacts investments 
and firm value during the financial crisis.  I do not find evidence that institutional investor type 
mitigates financial constraints spurring different investment behavior, but I do find that long-
term investors provide value-added monitoring benefits during crisis periods through the 
Table 13
Parameter Estimate tValue Estimate tValue
Intercept -0.4655 -17.2228 * -1.2281 -40.1599 *
Lag (Dumsp500) 0.3831 8.7200 * -0.5096 -11.0971 *
Lag (Q) -0.0003 -0.5333 0.0040 4.9937 *
Lag(SA-Index) -0.0350 -3.6991 * -0.3261 -30.8356 *
Intercept 19.6143 9.4706 * 17.2689 19.2008 *
Dedicated -0.6280 -2.7410 *
0.3862 2.5448 **
Fincrisis  -0.1899 -0.3820 -0.6147 -1.9861 **
Econcrisis  -1.7194 -2.5437 ** -0.1264 -0.3728
Fincrisis * Dedicated -0.1702 -0.2957
Econcrisis * Dedicated 1.1767 1.5517
Fincrisis * Transient -0.0170 -0.0476
Econcrisis * Transient -1.1690 -2.9333 *
SA-Index 3.8645 29.6593 * 3.4428 27.4981 *
Leverage 3.1846 70.1521 * 2.8657 71.0390 *
Inverse Mills Ratio -6.7115 -3.7570 * -6.0582 -10.2086 *
* denotes significance at 1% level
** denotes significance at 5% level
*** denotes significance at 10% level
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(Transient)
1st Stage Dependent 
Variable = Lag 
(Dedicated)
Dedicated = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by dedicated investors is in the top two 
quintiles, else Dedicated = 0. Transient = 1 if the percentage of institutionally owned shares by transient 
investors is in the top two quintiles, else Transient = 0.  Fincrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42007 - 
Q32008, else fincrisis = 0. Econcrisis = 1 if the period falls between Q42008 - Q22009, else econcrisis = 0. Sa-
Index is a proxy for financial constraints as intruduced by Hadlock, and Leverage = (long term debt + current 
debt) / total assets.
Second Stage Dependent Variable = Q
Heckman 2SLS Model
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investments channel. While many firms decrease capital and increase R&D expenditures during 
the economic crisis, firms with high dedicated investor presence better maintain pre-crisis levels 
of investment that decrease value losses during the crisis period.  Firms with high transient 
investor presence experience greater changes in investment expenditures and thus greater 
economic crisis period losses.  These findings support monitoring hypothesis and are robust to 
regression models which control for industry effects as well as self-selection bias.   
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